{"id":1297942,"date":"2025-09-26T16:15:29","date_gmt":"2025-09-26T13:15:29","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/russia-is-helping-china-prepare-for-a-strike-on-taiwan-what-is-known\/"},"modified":"2025-09-26T16:15:29","modified_gmt":"2025-09-26T13:15:29","slug":"russia-is-helping-china-prepare-for-a-strike-on-taiwan-what-is-known","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/en\/russia-is-helping-china-prepare-for-a-strike-on-taiwan-what-is-known\/","title":{"rendered":"Russia is helping China prepare for a strike on Taiwan: what is known"},"content":{"rendered":"

Journalists analyzed the leak of secret documents and found that Russia agreed to supply China with armored vehicles and train Chinese airborne units in airborne operations.<\/strong><\/p>\n

This is reported by The Washington Post<\/a> .<\/p>\n

New leaked documents show that Moscow is not only selling weapons to China, but also sharing combat experience and technology that could significantly enhance Beijing’s ability to conduct rapid airborne operations\u2014the very elements that could theoretically be used to attempt to seize key targets in Taiwan. The files document, among other things, specific supplies, technical adaptation programs, and personnel training plans.<\/p>\n

Carefully preserved correspondence and contracts show that in October 2024, the Russian and Chinese sides agreed to sell a batch of amphibious vehicles and special equipment. The technical list specified in the documents includes BMD-4M light amphibious armored vehicles, Sprut-SDM1 self-propelled anti-tank guns, BTR-MDM amphibious armored personnel carriers, command and observation vehicles, and special parachute systems for dropping heavy loads from high altitudes. In total, the preliminary cost of the contract was estimated at approximately $584 million before the final signing.<\/p>\n

Separate notes in the archive show that the Chinese side requested to speed up the delivery, send complete technical documents and adapt the equipment to Chinese hardware and software systems for communication, navigation and control. The files also record plans for organizing exercises: Russian instructors were to teach Chinese airborne units the tactics of using equipment, coordination methods and the operation of control systems in combat conditions – both on Russian territory and in China.<\/p>\n

Analysts point out that while the Chinese People’s Liberation Army is investing heavily in modernization, it is Russia’s experience in large-scale airborne operations and proven methods of dropping heavy equipment from high altitudes that Moscow still has an advantage over.<\/p>\n

Having received equipment, parachute complexes, and training, Beijing can more quickly increase its capabilities for landing mobile, well-armed units deep inside the port or near key infrastructure on the island.<\/p>\n

Experts warn that combining massive amphibious landings with simultaneous air operations significantly complicates defense.<\/p>\n

“Delivering small but heavily armed units to rear airfields or critical infrastructure is something that can change the course of any landing,” comments one analyst who worked with the materials.<\/p>\n

For Taiwan, this possibility is particularly threatening, because even with superiority in ammunition and artillery, the enemy only needs a few successful actions to destabilize the defense.<\/p>\n

The documents are not limited to equipment supplies: the files detail the issues of integrating Russian command and control systems into the Chinese control network, encrypting data transmissions, and operating in “bad” conditions \u2014 under destabilized communications or cyberattacks. It is important for Beijing to learn how to maintain control of operations “in a degraded environment,” and it is in this role that Russian instructors should share their established procedures.<\/p>\n

The archive also contains records of demonstrations: Russian exercises using airborne platforms and demonstration drops of heavy equipment from high altitudes (seen during joint maneuvers, including the Zapad-2025 exercises). Chinese military delegations, according to the files, attended these exercises and exchanged practical tasks.<\/p>\n

According to the publication and experts, the agreements demonstrate that cooperation between Moscow and Beijing is going beyond symbolic exercises and is developing into real joint development of joint combat capabilities. This complicates the task for the West to simultaneously contain Russian aggression in Europe and prepare for possible threats in the Asia-Pacific region.<\/p>\n

The documents also emphasize that in the event of a large-scale conflict, Russia could act as a “strategic reserve” for China in the form of energy resources and industrial support. Some analysts believe that such interdependence makes the countries’ security challenges even more closely linked.<\/p>\n

The Kremlin did not respond to requests for comment on the deals, nor did China’s defense ministry or state-owned defense companies, the publication notes. Taiwan, for its part, is monitoring developments and preparing appropriate defense measures; a Taiwanese security official interviewed by the journalists said the island considers information about the transfers and training to be a factor that increases the threat.<\/p>\n

Analysts at RUSI who reviewed the documents note two things: first, the materials indicate deep technical cooperation; second, they show China\u2019s intention not to simply purchase equipment, but to master the technology through training and localization of production. This means that the experience and techniques gained can be quickly replicated and scaled up within the Chinese defense industry.<\/p>\n

The existence of such agreements changes the balance of power in the region: if training, adaptation, and localization are successful, the PRC will gain more flexible and mobile air maneuver capabilities. For the international community, this creates a need for deeper coordination of defense assistance to Taiwan and a review of deterrence scenarios.<\/p>\n

At the same time, key questions remain: in what volumes and in what timeframe will the supply be implemented, what part of the contracts has already been fulfilled, and how quickly the Chinese army will be able to integrate the new systems into its operational procedures. The answers to these questions will depend on further facts and on whether official confirmations from the parties involved will appear.<\/p>\n

Recall that US President Donald Trump refused to approve a $400 million arms package for Taiwan<\/a> as he tries to negotiate a trade deal and a potential summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping.<\/p>\n

By the way, at the beginning of the year , China began construction of at least five new barges specifically designed for landing troops<\/a> . This could become part of Beijing’s military strategy in the event of an attempted landing on Taiwan.<\/p>\n

As reported, China is strengthening its military presence around Taiwan and increasing its readiness for a surprise strike on the island.<\/a><\/p>\n

Also follow \u201cPryamim\u201d<\/strong> on Facebook<\/a> , Twitter<\/a> , Telegram<\/a> , and Instagram.<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Journalists analyzed the leak of secret documents and found that Russia agreed to supply China with armored vehicles and train Chinese airborne units in airborne operations. This is reported by The Washington Post . New leaked documents show that Moscow is not only selling weapons to China, but also sharing combat experience and technology that […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":54,"featured_media":870476,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"ep_exclude_from_search":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[76870,76871,76872,76875],"class_list":["post-1297942","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-world","category-news-2","category-news-feed","category-other-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1297942","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/54"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1297942"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1297942\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/870476"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1297942"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1297942"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}