{"id":1310590,"date":"2025-10-23T15:05:31","date_gmt":"2025-10-23T12:05:31","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/contract-soldiers-are-fleeing-theres-no-money-to-pay-svo-soldiers-how-ukraine-is-hitting-the-kremlins-achilles-heel\/"},"modified":"2025-10-25T10:14:02","modified_gmt":"2025-10-25T07:14:02","slug":"contract-soldiers-are-fleeing-theres-no-money-to-pay-svo-soldiers-how-ukraine-is-hitting-the-kremlins-achilles-heel","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/en\/contract-soldiers-are-fleeing-theres-no-money-to-pay-svo-soldiers-how-ukraine-is-hitting-the-kremlins-achilles-heel\/","title":{"rendered":"The Russian Army Is Crumbling from Within: No Pay, No Faith, No Future"},"content":{"rendered":"

The occupying army is facing a dual crisis \u2014 a shortage of soldiers and a lack of funds to pay those still fighting. The Kremlin\u2019s war machine is faltering under the weight of its own ambitions.<\/strong><\/p>\n

According to Russian media, the authorities in St. Petersburg have retroactively canceled<\/strong> the 1.6 million ruble payment promised to volunteers participating in the so-called \u201cSVO.\u201d Several servicemen, who discovered the change only after contacting their local social welfare offices, terminated their contracts<\/strong> after realizing they would not receive the promised compensation.<\/p>\n

This situation clearly demonstrates that the Russian Federation is facing serious problems \u2014 not only with personnel recruitment, but, more importantly, with funding the active phase of its war<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

The issue stems from the massive damage inflicted on Russia\u2019s economy<\/strong> by Ukrainian drone strikes targeting oil refineries. Economists estimate the losses at around $100 billion<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

Even Russian sources acknowledge that 38% of the country\u2019s oil refineries<\/strong> have been partially or completely shut down as a result of these strikes. Since oil and petroleum products account for roughly 30% of Russia\u2019s budget revenues<\/strong>, Ukraine\u2019s strategy is clearly aimed at crippling the Kremlin\u2019s ability to finance its war<\/strong>. In essence, the Defense Forces of Ukraine have struck at Russia\u2019s Achilles\u2019 heel<\/strong> \u2014 its dependence on oil income \u2014 undermining its capacity to sustain the war and replenish its \u201ccannon fodder.\u201d<\/p>\n

According to Ukrainian intelligence, the greatest difficulties in recruiting new contract soldiers are being observed in Russia\u2019s poorest regions<\/strong>, particularly in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

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According to internal documents from the Russian Ministry of Defense<\/strong>, the low recruitment rates are primarily caused by insufficient regional payments<\/strong> and the unwillingness of local authorities<\/strong> to actively support the mobilization campaign.<\/p>\n

On average, recruitment centers in the regions are operating at about 60% of the targets<\/strong> set by Moscow \u2014 a shortfall of roughly 40%<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

Another key reason behind the failure is the heavy losses suffered among the local population<\/strong>, particularly among ethnic minorities such as the Yakuts, Evenki, and Evens<\/strong>, who increasingly refuse to \u201cdie for Moscow\u2019s interests.\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n

A similar pattern is emerging across other Far Eastern regions of Russia<\/strong>, where social fatigue, distrust toward the federal center, and fear of casualties have significantly undermined mobilization efforts.<\/p>\n

As for the so-called \u201ccannon fodder,\u201d<\/strong> the situation is catastrophic: the average life expectancy of a newly contracted Russian assault infantryman is only about 12 days.<\/strong> The first day is spent signing the contract, roughly 10 days of minimal training<\/strong>, and within less than two weeks<\/strong>, they are sent directly to the front line \u2014 often never to return.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/article>\n

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The first combat encounter \u2014 and a Russian family receives a kilogram of dumplings as \u201ccompensation\u201d for a dead son or father.<\/p>\n

The overwhelming majority of Russian military losses now consist of residents of the occupied territories of Ukraine<\/strong>, primarily from the east. The population density<\/strong> in these areas remains relatively high, particularly among men of conscription age. The occupation authorities understand<\/strong> that it is far easier to mobilize in the occupied territories than within the Russian Federation itself, where such measures could spark discontent and protests.<\/p>\n

By conscripting Ukrainians from occupied regions, Moscow kills two birds with one stone<\/strong>: replenishing its army\u2019s ranks while simultaneously depopulating and Russifying the occupied areas<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

This strategy effectively turns the war into a colonial campaign<\/strong>. Russia secures its control not only through military force but also through the physical extermination of the local male population<\/strong>, which could otherwise organize resistance. The occupiers do not trust the locals \u2014 so they eliminate them, one mobilization wave at a time.<\/p>\n

The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs<\/strong> has strongly condemned Russia\u2019s autumn draft in the occupied territories, stressing that forced service in the Russian Armed Forces constitutes a war crime<\/strong> under international law. The ministry emphasized that forcibly conscripted Ukrainians are being used as \u201ccannon fodder\u201d<\/strong> in a war against their own country, and urged residents of occupied regions to avoid conscription by any means possible<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, despite the acute shortage of manpower<\/strong>, Russia continues trying to intensify its offensive operations<\/strong>. The Kremlin is attempting to compensate for its losses by mobilizing conscripts, reservists, and mercenaries<\/strong>, but the growing reliance on coercion and desperation only exposes the systemic weakness of its war machine.<\/p>\n

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Also, follow “Pryamyi”<\/strong> on Facebook<\/a>, Twitter<\/a>, Telegram<\/a>, and Instagram<\/a>.<\/p>\n

\u2022 Materials published in the \u201cTHOUGHTS\u201d section reflect the opinion of the author of the publication, who bears full responsibility for the accuracy of the information.<\/em>
\n\u2022 The editorial board of prm.ua may not share the opinions expressed in the author\u2019s material.<\/em>
\n\u2022 The owner of the web page in the \u201cTHOUGHTS\u201d section is the author of the publication.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The occupying army is facing a dual crisis \u2014 a shortage of soldiers and a lack of funds to pay those still fighting. The Kremlin\u2019s war machine is faltering under the weight of its own ambitions. According to Russian media, the authorities in St. Petersburg have retroactively canceled the 1.6 million ruble payment promised to […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":31,"featured_media":1265464,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"ep_exclude_from_search":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[76871,76872,76991],"class_list":["post-1310590","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-news-2","category-news-feed","category-opinions"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1310590","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/31"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1310590"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1310590\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1311326,"href":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1310590\/revisions\/1311326"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1265464"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1310590"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1310590"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}