{"id":1450994,"date":"2026-10-09T14:50:36","date_gmt":"2026-10-09T11:50:36","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/strategic-cannon-fodder-how-the-occupiers-are-eliminating-their-own-scarce-personnel-in-meat-assaults\/"},"modified":"2026-10-09T14:50:36","modified_gmt":"2026-10-09T11:50:36","slug":"strategic-cannon-fodder-how-the-occupiers-are-eliminating-their-own-scarce-personnel-in-meat-assaults","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/en\/strategic-cannon-fodder-how-the-occupiers-are-eliminating-their-own-scarce-personnel-in-meat-assaults\/","title":{"rendered":"Strategic Cannon Fodder: How the Occupiers Are Eliminating Their Own Scarce Personnel in &#8220;Meat Assaults&#8221;"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><strong>Over the past 24 hours, the aggressor country lost approximately 1,830 soldiers in the war against Ukraine. Total losses of the Russian army as of October 9 amount to approximately 1,547,780 soldiers killed and wounded.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p> It should be noted that the rate of losses of the Russian army in the war against Ukraine significantly exceeds the capabilities of its mobilization potential.<span class=\"Apple-converted-space\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Official data on the losses of the occupiers clearly illustrate this critical disproportion.<\/p>\n<p> In September 2026, Russian occupation forces suffered 46,230 casualties. According to official data from the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, this figure was an all-time high for 2026.<\/p>\n<p> In the first 9 months of 2026, the Ukrainian Defense Forces neutralized 326,900 Russian invaders.<\/p>\n<p> Compared to January, the Russian army&#8217;s monthly casualty rate increased by 45.8%, or 14,520 personnel, by September. According to the Ukrainian Armed Forces command, this statistic is a direct consequence of the ineffectiveness of Russia&#8217;s military leadership and the increased precision of Ukrainian strikes.<\/p>\n<p> The Russian mobilization system&#8217;s capacity to replenish personnel monthly is estimated at 30,000 to 35,000 through contract soldiers and conscripts. However, due to the rapidly increasing losses of occupation forces at the front, this system is no longer able to fully compensate for the loss of manpower.<\/p>\n<p> During the first two-thirds of the year, the Russian army&#8217;s base enrollment remained at 35,000 men per month, thanks to contract and conscript recruits. Financial incentives remain the primary tool\u2014attracting recruits through steadily increasing one-time regional payments for signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense.<\/p>\n<p> As evidence of the depletion of the enemy&#8217;s operational reserves, I will cite operational data from the analytical department of the &#8220;Right Cause&#8221; State Institution on the redeployment of the occupiers&#8217; operational reserves in the Sumy direction.<\/p>\n<p> According to Pravoye Delo, a redeployment of operational reserves from additional units of the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Regiment has been recorded in the area of Ulanovye in Sumy Oblast.<span class=\"Apple-converted-space\">\u00a0 <\/span>Strategic Missile Forces.<span class=\"Apple-converted-space\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p>This is a separate branch of the armed forces, directly subordinate to the General Staff of the Russian Federation. Therefore, the use of Strategic Missile Forces units on the front lines as attack aircraft clearly demonstrates the scale of the enemy&#8217;s problem with replenishing personnel and operational reserves.<\/p>\n<p> It&#8217;s noteworthy that the Strategic Missile Forces&#8217; headquarters structure has historically never included &#8220;motorized rifle regiments&#8221; or &#8220;battalions&#8221;\u2014it only has missile divisions, technical bases, and security and reconnaissance battalions. Nevertheless, due to a lack of reserves, the Russian command took an unprecedented step.<\/p>\n<p> Russia&#8217;s military leadership removed personnel from the Strategic Missile Forces, including servicemen from technical and security units that serviced or guarded strategic missile systems, and relegated them to the status of regular line infantry. The so-called<span class=\"Apple-converted-space\">\u00a0 <\/span>&#8220;combined rifle regiment&#8221; of the Strategic Missile Forces and other similar units, which are organizationally divided into battalions.<\/p>\n<p> Although these units may be referred to as &#8220;motorized rifle&#8221; on paper or in orders, the soldiers fight as regular assault infantry.<span class=\"Apple-converted-space\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p>According to the Military portal, the formation of these units and their first deployment to the combat zone took place in late summer 2024. More active deployment began in August, initially in the occupied territories of the Kharkiv region, but by September their activity was also recorded in the Kursk region.<\/p>\n<p> The fighters of such units are not integrated into ground forces units, but continue to carry out missions in separate battalions of the Strategic Missile Forces, subordinate to regiments and brigades on the front lines.<\/p>\n<p> The number of personnel in a combined regiment can vary from one to two thousand people, but the actual number may be different under wartime conditions.<\/p>\n<p> It is noteworthy that the use of highly qualified specialists as &#8220;cannon fodder&#8221; in conventional assaults is a direct consequence of the fact that the classic Russian contract replenishment system can no longer keep up with the rate of monthly losses on the battlefield.<\/p>\n<p> Accordingly, due to the acute shortage of personnel, the Russian political and military leadership will be forced to intensify the second wave of mobilization without attracting undue public attention.<\/p>\n<p> The legal basis for this remains the current mobilization decree, signed by the Russian dictator back in 2022, but still not repealed.<\/p>\n<p> A possible new wave of mobilization is linked to the fact that the current rate of recruitment does not fully cover losses at the front.<span class=\"Apple-converted-space\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Please note that the Russian State Duma has passed a law expanding the mobilization reserve by raising the age limit for reserve service. The new law increases all age limits for reserve and mobilization reserve personnel by five years. It also increases the age limit for mobilization reserve service to 65 for senior officers and to 60 for junior officers. For all other categories, the age limit for mobilization reserve service has been raised by 10 years, from 45 to 55.<\/p>\n<p> Also follow <strong>&#8220;Pryamy&#8221;<\/strong> on <a href=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/pryamiy\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\">Facebook<\/a> , <a href=\"https:\/\/x.com\/prm_ua\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\">X<\/a> , <a href=\"https:\/\/t.me\/+rtV4dxYu2_cyNjVi\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">Telegram<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.instagram.com\/pryamiy\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\">Instagram.<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Over the past 24 hours, the aggressor country lost approximately 1,830 soldiers in the war against Ukraine. Total losses of the Russian army as of October 9 amount to approximately 1,547,780 soldiers killed and wounded. It should be noted that the rate of losses of the Russian army in the war against Ukraine significantly exceeds [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":24,"featured_media":1380038,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"ep_exclude_from_search":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[76991,76871,76872,76874,76875],"class_list":["post-1450994","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-opinions","category-news-2","category-news-feed","category-war","category-other-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1450994","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/24"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1450994"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1450994\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1380038"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1450994"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/prm.ua\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1450994"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}