Anatomy of sabotage in Vyshneve: how the explosions near Kyiv confirmed the systemic failure of counterintelligence

During the last combined enemy attack, an ammunition depot at one of the Ukroboronprom enterprises in Vyshneve was hit. This provoked a severe fire and a powerful secondary detonation that lasted for many hours.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that a criminal case has been opened into the explosions. The state leadership announced large-scale layoffs in the structure of Ukroboronprom due to the placement of ammunition near civilian buildings, which directly violates the current orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The first question after such attacks should be different: where does the Russian side get information about the locations of personnel, warehouses with ammunition, fuel and lubricants, repair bases, defense enterprises, and people associated with the military sphere?

Why, in the fifth year of the war, do we have such a low level of counterintelligence protection that the occupiers have the opportunity to obtain information about the locations of personnel bases, warehouses with BC, fuel and lubricants, etc.? We need to start with this. In the case of Vyshneve, the key question is not only whether there could have been warehouses with ammunition there, but also how the Russians could have found out about it.

The presence of information among Russian intelligence services that there were BC warehouses in Vyshneve. This is the main reason, not just the fact that BC warehouses were located. The main point is why military counterintelligence allowed the scenarios that are currently taking place: the destruction of warehouses and numerous human casualties.

The strike on Vyshneve cannot be viewed as an isolated incident. It fits into a broader context where Russian intelligence services demonstrate awareness of Ukrainian military facilities, specialists, and defense-related infrastructure.

As an example, I will mention the targeted attack by enemy UAVs on the house of the advisor to the Minister of Defense of Ukraine, a well-known expert in electronic warfare (EW) and communications, Serhiy Beskrestnov (call sign “Flash”). The victim miraculously survived. He was injured and hospitalized. His condition was assessed as stable.

A completely logical question arises as to whether the occupiers have information about the place of residence of the advisor to the Minister of Defense. This is a high-profile specialist, such a unit. If the enemy’s intelligence services know not only the place of residence, but also the schedule of his movements, then I have even more questions.

Another case is the so-called “Golosiivka shooter” . Despite attempts by the Ukrainian media to present him as an agent of Russian special services, this person served in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. According to official data from the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, Vasylchenkov was a military pensioner. From 1992 to 2005, he served in the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in various positions.

And again, the question for military counterintelligence: how did a pro-Russian person serve in the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine? Why did he not become the object of operational development by SBU employees? These questions become even more acute given the size of the Security Service of Ukraine.

Let me remind you that in 2025, the President of Ukraine signed a law that increased the staff of the department . In a special period (during war): the maximum number is up to 41,000 employees. In peacetime, the staff should be reduced to 37,000 people.

By comparison, leading European states maintain much smaller separate agencies. For example, in the UK, the Main Internal Security and Counter-Intelligence Service (MI5) has just over 5,000 employees. The Foreign Intelligence Service (MI6) has about 3,600 employees. Together, they are almost a quarter smaller than the SBU.

In Germany, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV – internal security) has approximately 4,200 employees. The Federal Intelligence Service (BND – foreign intelligence) has approximately 6,500 employees. In France, the General Directorate for Internal Security (DGSI) coordinates the work of approximately 4,500–5,000 employees.

I would like to draw special attention to Russian Telegram channels, which, after such strikes, refer to Ukrainian open sources, including court decisions. This creates two problems at once: first, the enemy can receive or confirm information about the locations of the facilities; second, the enemy can use this data for information and psychological operations against Ukraine.

As an example, I will mention the publications of Russian public forums regarding the decision of the Ukrainian court, which includes the State Enterprise “Plant 410 CA” in Kyiv. The court document, which Russian sources refer to, refers to the fact of the destruction on July 4, 2025 of the temporary storage of ammunition of a military unit on the territory of this plant as a result of being hit by an enemy Shahed UAV.

The document also states that, in addition to ammunition for small arms, large-caliber ammunition was stored there, which the case materials call a gross violation of security requirements and orders from the high command.

In addition, the case states that after the previous strike on June 17, 2025, measures were organized to move property: some were prepared or taken out, but the second strike on July 4 occurred before this process was completed. The materials also state that logistical actions were carried out, but there was a lack of transport, special equipment, drivers, and personnel. Separately, the court notes that the territory of the State Enterprise “Plant 410 CA” has been used by a military unit since 2022.

In my opinion, the very presence of sensitive information in open court documents requires a response from the state.

The Ukrainian court actually gave the occupiers the opportunity to understand the locations of the BC warehouses, and most importantly, it gave them the opportunity to conduct informational and psychological operations accusing Ukraine of violating the rules and norms of warfare. This is a very serious problem.

The location of BC depots, personnel, or equipment in areas of concentration of the civilian population can be used by the enemy as an argument in its information propaganda. That is why the strike on Vyshneve had not only a military purpose.

Why did the occupiers strike Vyshneve? The enemy understood perfectly well that there would be a secondary detonation, which would lead to the death of the civilian population. But all attempts to accuse the occupying country of strikes on civilian infrastructure will be leveled by the occupiers later by the very fact of the location of the BC warehouses directly in the urban area. That is, according to the Russians’ plan, this will already boomerang on the Ukrainian side.

I am convinced that such strikes are multi-vector. First, the destruction of warehouses or military property. Second, casualties among the civilian population. Third, the creation of social tension within Ukraine. Fourth, an attempt to accuse the Ukrainian side of violating the rules and norms of warfare. Fifth, provoking a conflict within the Ukrainian power bloc.

An additional problem is created by public comments by officials if they confirm sensitive details that can then be used by the enemy. Immediately after the explosions in Vyshneve began, the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine Klymenko reported on his Telegram channel: “The situation in the Kyiv region is difficult… In Vyshneve, due to the threat of a second detonation, we have begun evacuating residents from the dangerous territory.”

If an official comments on such events and actually confirms a secondary detonation , this may create an artificial conflict between representatives of the power bloc. It is noteworthy that the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine immediately reacted to these statements and emphasized that the facility was not subordinate to the military, since the current order of the Commander-in-Chief strictly prohibits placing army arsenals next to residential buildings.

However, the problem is not limited to Vyshneve or Plant No. 410. Data about companies that fulfill defense orders, UAV production, repair bases, private defense enterprises, and even people who work there may remain publicly available.

The fifth year of the war. The occupiers are selectively striking enterprises, UAV factories, and repair bases, because the information is available in open sources. Russian publics sometimes directly write who among the general designers of certain defense enterprises lives where, and directly warn: they say, we will strike at a residential building, neighbors, leave.

I believe this indicates the lack of a proper counterintelligence regime.

In this context, it is worth mentioning other cases that demonstrate problems with special checks. Among them is the story with Arestovych . I would like to draw your attention to the fact that only after my publications was the decision made to dismiss Arestovych. I note that he underwent a special check by the SBU.

In addition, it is worth mentioning Alexei Filippov, a former Russian officer who was infiltrated by Russian special services into the environment associated with Azov and also underwent a special check.

The Russian “opposition” publication “Meduza” cites Filippov’s recollections of the special SBU inspection. “Towards evening … officers of the Security Service of Ukraine arrived. Filippov repeated again that he was on the side of the Ukrainians and ready to fight. They took him to an apartment on the outskirts of the town for the night, and in the morning, accompanied by an SBU officer, he took the train to Kyiv. There he was met by employees of the Kyiv department of the service… Filippov passed all the inspections. He moved around Kyiv completely freely, living in a hotel.”

The analytical department of the “Prava Sprava” GI conducted its own special check of Filipov and I had a meeting with the SBU leadership on this matter. As a result, Filipov was given the opportunity to “break out” of Ukraine, explaining his decision by his unwillingness to enter into conflict with structures close to the then Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine Avakov.

The third example is Alexander Morozov, a Russian political strategist who positioned himself as a “victim of the Putin regime.” He actually headed the public organization “Battalion Brotherhood.” The organization’s rallies, in particular under the Presidential Administration in February 2015, were actively used by Russian TV channels as a picture to destabilize the situation in Ukraine. It is noteworthy that he also underwent a special check by the SBU and only after I published information about his connections with the special services of the occupying country was a decision made to deport him from Ukraine. On March 31, 2015, the SBU deported Russian political strategist and member of the board of “Battalion Brotherhood” Alexander Morozov to Russia with a 5-year entry ban.

All these stories — from strikes on warehouses and enterprises to issues of special checks on individuals — lead to one conclusion: Ukraine needs to review not only the rules for the placement of military property, but also the entire nature of the activities of counterintelligence agencies.

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