The Russian Army Is Crumbling from Within: No Pay, No Faith, No Future

The occupying army is facing a dual crisis — a shortage of soldiers and a lack of funds to pay those still fighting. The Kremlin’s war machine is faltering under the weight of its own ambitions.

According to Russian media, the authorities in St. Petersburg have retroactively canceled the 1.6 million ruble payment promised to volunteers participating in the so-called “SVO.” Several servicemen, who discovered the change only after contacting their local social welfare offices, terminated their contracts after realizing they would not receive the promised compensation.

This situation clearly demonstrates that the Russian Federation is facing serious problems — not only with personnel recruitment, but, more importantly, with funding the active phase of its war.

The issue stems from the massive damage inflicted on Russia’s economy by Ukrainian drone strikes targeting oil refineries. Economists estimate the losses at around $100 billion.

Even Russian sources acknowledge that 38% of the country’s oil refineries have been partially or completely shut down as a result of these strikes. Since oil and petroleum products account for roughly 30% of Russia’s budget revenues, Ukraine’s strategy is clearly aimed at crippling the Kremlin’s ability to finance its war. In essence, the Defense Forces of Ukraine have struck at Russia’s Achilles’ heel — its dependence on oil income — undermining its capacity to sustain the war and replenish its “cannon fodder.”

According to Ukrainian intelligence, the greatest difficulties in recruiting new contract soldiers are being observed in Russia’s poorest regions, particularly in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia).

The first combat encounter — and a Russian family receives a kilogram of dumplings as “compensation” for a dead son or father.

The overwhelming majority of Russian military losses now consist of residents of the occupied territories of Ukraine, primarily from the east. The population density in these areas remains relatively high, particularly among men of conscription age. The occupation authorities understand that it is far easier to mobilize in the occupied territories than within the Russian Federation itself, where such measures could spark discontent and protests.

By conscripting Ukrainians from occupied regions, Moscow kills two birds with one stone: replenishing its army’s ranks while simultaneously depopulating and Russifying the occupied areas.

This strategy effectively turns the war into a colonial campaign. Russia secures its control not only through military force but also through the physical extermination of the local male population, which could otherwise organize resistance. The occupiers do not trust the locals — so they eliminate them, one mobilization wave at a time.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has strongly condemned Russia’s autumn draft in the occupied territories, stressing that forced service in the Russian Armed Forces constitutes a war crime under international law. The ministry emphasized that forcibly conscripted Ukrainians are being used as “cannon fodder” in a war against their own country, and urged residents of occupied regions to avoid conscription by any means possible.

Meanwhile, despite the acute shortage of manpower, Russia continues trying to intensify its offensive operations. The Kremlin is attempting to compensate for its losses by mobilizing conscripts, reservists, and mercenaries, but the growing reliance on coercion and desperation only exposes the systemic weakness of its war machine.