After Ukraine, the Baltics? Russia Widens Grounds for Foreign Deployments

Recently, the Russian State Duma passed a law granting Russian dictator Vladimir Putin the formal right to unilaterally deploy Russian troops abroad under the pretext of “protecting the rights and freedoms of Russian citizens.” The move has raised concerns that the Kremlin is expanding the legal framework for future military interventions beyond Ukraine.

This document introduces conceptual changes to the federal laws of the occupying country, “On Defense” and “On Citizenship.” Now, the Russian army can officially be deployed abroad if a citizen of that country is arrested, detained, or prosecuted under criminal or other law. The law applies to decisions of foreign courts made “without the participation of the Russian Federation,” as well as to decisions of international judicial bodies that Moscow does not recognize (for example, the International Criminal Court).

The State Duma’s relevant committee noted that the law is also intended to “protect Russian organizations from foreign illegal attacks,” by which the Kremlin de facto means the seizure of state assets and sanctions. The law introduces the concept of “extraterritorial use” of the army. Now, the final authority to send soldiers abroad in such cases rests directly with the Russian president.

Please note that the State Duma of the Russian Federation’s adoption of this law coincides with the intensification of diplomatic processes. 

This move is primarily aimed at the United States and its allies. The occupying power is thus demonstrating its readiness for further escalation scenarios and effectively asserting its “right” to preemptively use armed force to protect its own citizens or Russian-speaking populations abroad. This has resulted in the emergence of a concept that declares the countries of the post-Soviet space to be Russia’s zone of military and political interests.

Accordingly, the Baltic states are primarily within the potential zone of application of the occupying power’s armed forces. This means that this is not only about exerting pressure on individual states but also about creating a challenge for NATO. In this context, the so-called Suwalki Gap scenario—a hypothetical land route that could connect Belarus with the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad Oblast—is particularly noteworthy. Such a corridor would run through Poland and the Baltic states.

An additional signal is provided by Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov’s preliminary statements that ending the war against Ukraine is only possible with “security guarantees” for the occupying country. In this sense, the adoption of the law is a continuation of this rhetoric: Russia is attempting to impose its own vision of the security architecture, in particular regarding non-expansion of NATO, and to secure its ability to take preemptive action, including strikes on the territory of potential adversaries.

On a practical level, this is accompanied by an escalation of tensions in border regions. In particular, in Estonia, an information campaign is intensifying about possible scenarios in border towns like Narva, where destabilization or even occupation is being discussed. At the same time, Russia is strengthening its military infrastructure on the border with Finland, which also creates dangerous scenarios for escalation.

The Baltic region as a whole deserves special mention. There have been statements about Russia’s potential claims to the island of Gotland, which is strategically important for maritime control. Thus, it is possible to say that the Baltic states, as well as Finland, Sweden, and other states in the region, would be the first to be targeted by the aggressor state’s military. At the same time, a political signal to post-Soviet countries, particularly Moldova, cannot be ruled out.

Belarus also cannot be ruled out, especially given recent events surrounding its gradual rapprochement with the United States. A similar situation applies to Kazakhstan, which the occupying power increasingly views as an unfriendly state.

In summary, this law aims to delineate so-called “red lines”—zones of Russia’s military and political influence. Its effect effectively extends to both former Soviet countries and NATO states bordering the occupying power.

One key aspect is the possibility of using the army to “protect” Russians if they are arrested abroad. In fact, this provision can be interpreted much more broadly. It applies not only to ordinary citizens but also to individuals who may be involved in activities in Russia’s interests.

For example, in the context of current relations with Azerbaijan, the detention of Russian citizens in response to Russian actions against Azerbaijani citizens could be used as a pretext for further pressure. Moreover, such situations could become a tool for reducing the influence of other players in the region, primarily the United States in the Caucasus, which Russia traditionally considers an area of its exclusive interests. This refers to the so-called Trump Corridor—the agreements signed between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the United States. Such initiatives could also be viewed by Russia as a threat to its influence and, therefore, as an additional pretext for political or even military pressure. Thus, this law sends yet another signal to both Armenia and Azerbaijan.

As for the Western reaction, military analysts and intelligence agencies in NATO countries view this move as Russia creating a premature legal foothold for potential hybrid or direct military operations against European states.

For Ukraine, this law creates additional risks. It effectively undermines the foundations of statehood, since the concept of “Russian-speaking population” or “citizens of Russia” is rather arbitrary and subject to arbitrary interpretation by Russia. While the annexation and occupation of eastern regions was previously justified by the “protection” of Russian-speaking people, now the legal basis for similar actions in the future is being established.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs called the adopted law “aggressive lawlessness.” Foreign Ministry spokesman Georgiy Tykhyi drew a direct historical parallel with the actions of Nazi Germany in 1938, when Adolf Hitler justified the occupation of the Czechoslovak Sudetenland with identical slogans about “protecting compatriots.”

As for the practical application of this law, it’s difficult to make precise predictions. The occupying power’s primary resources are concentrated in the war against Ukraine. Its ability to wage active combat against other countries is limited—in terms of human, technical, and financial resources. Opening a second front would create serious problems for Russia. Therefore, further developments will largely depend on the situation in Ukraine and the progress of the war on its territory.