Steel Kumpol: How Ukrainian Civilians Are Powering a “People’s Iron Dome”

Source: Author’s Facebook page
Well, my kitties and bunnies, shall we move on? At last, we—those in the rear—have found a mission in this long war that is not only useful but also energizing and even fun.

We were already part of the “mud” in which, according to Trump, Putin’s invincible tanks got stuck — and now we need to become our own Ukrainian Iron Dome.
Seriously, massive drone strikes against enemy lines are playing an increasingly important role in our war of survival and attrition.

Both sides are heavily relying on this tactic, almost as their primary strategy, and their chosen approaches to deep strikes are in stark contrast — although both were developed and tested back in World War II…
Ukraine took as its basis the approach practiced by Britain and the United States in 1942-43: to carefully study the enemy’s military-industrial complex, while focusing attention not on the final assembly enterprises, but on those links in the production chain that are unique or at least not duplicated much, produce critically important components, and the failure of which stops the entire supply chain for the production of a particular type of weapon.

I  call this approach “bearing”, because at one point the bombing of just one (!) German bearing factory reduced the output of all military equipment of the Reich (from automobiles to aircraft) by a third – after all, it “suddenly turned out” that bearings were used in all equipment without exception, and only two factories produced them in the country. Our equivalent of that Nazi-bearing factory may well be, for example, the recently targeted and likely sole manufacturer of the “Kometa” navigation system. in the entire Russian Reich, which is used in all subsonic long-range weapons, from cruise missiles to “Shaheeds”.

Meanwhile, the Russian Reich is enthusiastically cosplaying the Nazis with its strategy of “turning enemy cities into nightmares.” The current Shahed raids on Kyiv are virtually identical to the V-1 and V-2 missile attacks on London — both in terms of intensity and the notorious “accuracy” of the strikes.

The underlying goal is the same: unable to defeat the enemy’s army directly, they attempt to terrorize the civilian population so that, in a democratic society, it becomes the weak link and begins demanding “peace at any cost.”

It’s somewhat ironic that the Rashists, with their obsession for historical reenactments and their cult of World War II, seem unable to distinguish which of the two deep strike strategies led to victory and which ended at Nuremberg.

But that’s their problem. Let the psychiatrists sort it out later — we have our task: namely, to repel the Shahed invasion in our skies.

The scale of the Shahed raids has demanded such a massive air defense response that it is physically impossible for the Armed Forces of Ukraine to handle it alone. Deploying the military for this task is not even a rational use of resources.

Our defenders already have more than enough to do: destroying enemy forces at the front and striking strategic targets in the enemy’s rear. Meanwhile, we in the Ukrainian rear are perfectly capable of taking on the responsibility of protecting our cities from all kinds of “Kherans.”

The foundation of Russia’s mass air attacks currently consists of Shahed/Geran and “Gerber”-type drones — large, relatively slow-flying aircraft that are fairly easy to shoot down at low altitudes. Accordingly, the backbone of our defense against them should consist of mobile units in jeeps and trucks equipped with anti-aircraft weapons — from large-caliber machine guns to conventional 7.62mm guns and 20–30mm automatic cannons.

It’s simple, effective, and cheap. The only downside is that it requires a fairly large number of personnel — distributed evenly across the vast territory of our country. And with the current (and expected to continue throughout the year) increase in the intensity of drone raids, it turns out that to counter them effectively, the number of mobile air defense groups must approach that of infantry units at the front — even though there is already a critical shortage of infantry.

But there is a solution. The author of these lines proposed it last summer. I don’t know whether the idea simply took time to “mature” and take root, or if the Ministry of Defense independently arrived at the same decision due to changing circumstances — the important thing is that it’s finally happening.

This week, a Cabinet resolution initiated by the Ministry of Defense was adopted, which now allows civilians like you and me — those working in the rear — to take part in defending the skies above us.

The resolution permits anyone willing to become part of the “Iron Kumpol” initiative, without any restrictions related to military mobilization or contracts with the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Men and women alike are now entitled to hunt “Shaheds,” regardless of age — whether they are too young to serve or have already aged out of the draft.

Participation is also allowed for individuals unfit for military service due to health reasons (finally — I’ve been waiting for this!), as well as those on work-related leave or deferment for any reason.

Personal vehicles may be used (which is logical — the state simply doesn’t have enough cars for this scale of operation, and as usual, we’ll just pool resources and make it happen, because that’s what we do).

There’s also an interesting detail regarding weapons: some will be issued from military reserves, but it is also permitted to purchase your own. I haven’t yet bought any anti-aircraft guns or MANPADS myself — we’ll see how that works out — but the idea itself makes perfect sense.

For the legal status of volunteer air defense units, the government has adopted the framework already used for Territorial Defense Volunteer Units (DFTG), which proved effective in 2022. It’s a wise decision — there’s no need to reinvent the wheel when an existing and functional model is available.

“Overall, the idea carries both significant potential and serious risks.”

For example, when I was denied the prospects of this initiative a year ago, the argument was strong and valid: the risk of friendly fire.

I clearly remember the first weeks of the invasion and the alarming number of friendly fire incidents involving untrained but armed members of the Territorial Defense. Back then, civilians only had Kalashnikovs. Now, we are talking about heavy weaponry.

So the challenge of ensuring that careless fire from volunteer air defense groups doesn’t cause more damage than the Shaheds themselves is far from imaginary. In fact, it deserves almost top priority at the very start of implementing this otherwise excellent idea.

This problem can—and must—be addressed during the training phase of the newly formed mobile groups. After all, gods don’t make pots, and there’s nothing supernatural about hunting Shaheds. The key is that between the formation of a DFTG air defense group and its first real mission, there must be proper training with competent instructors at a designated training ground.

But what’s even more important now is completing the very first step: forming a substantial pool of volunteers who will take part in this “people’s air defense.”

Whether the story of “people’s air defense” becomes a repeat of our two previous success stories—the Dobrobats of 2014 and the TrO-DFTG of 2022—or ends up another disappointment like the recruitment centers and the “18–24” campaign, depends entirely on you and me, my kitties and bunnies.

The conditions are in place for both outcomes.

With its new resolution, the state has untied our hands and allowed us to take up serious arms. But the system involves no coercion. If we remain passive and idle—failing to step forward and take these weapons—the Shaheds will continue flying over us more and more often. And each morning, we’ll be reading about new civilian casualties and watching neighboring homes smolder in ruins.

If we respond en masse to the opportunity we’ve been given to forge a partisan Iron Dome over our cities, then over the summer we’ll be able to work through all the inevitable bureaucratic hurdles that come with launching a bold, unprecedented initiative like this.

Of course, it will become clear that the resolution itself doesn’t cover everything, and plenty of devils in the details and hidden pitfalls will emerge.

Everything—especially anything involving the state or the military—will initially be clumsy and convoluted. But that’s exactly how it started with the Dobrobats and the TrO-DFTG.

This phase can and must be overcome. Then, by autumn—when, judging by the pace of drone production in Raska, I expect the main campaign of air raids on our cities to begin—we will already have a functioning and battle-ready “people’s air defense” system.

Over the summer, we’ll have time to properly recruit new members into these groups, build up their logistical and material base, and evolve into a real mass movement—fully capable of shooting down a significant number of enemy drones.

This will become our safeguard against mass civilian casualties during airstrikes, disruptions at defense production facilities, and power grid blackouts. All of this can be prevented by our own homemade Iron Dome—if it becomes widespread enough.

Our greatest strength has always been our ability to self-organize. The state has finally helped by simply stepping aside and giving us the freedom to act. Now the state has made its move—it’s our turn.

If we want a warm and peaceful winter, we must form mobile groups this summer and train as quickly as possible, acquiring the skills necessary to protect our skies.

Anyone who knows how to drive can start learning to operate pickup trucks with manual transmissions. Those who have experience with firearms are the first candidates to learn how to handle submachine guns and machine guns. Fans of computer games can jump right in and learn to control anti-aircraft drones. Those successful in business can help ensure proper material support for the national air defense.

There will be enough work for everyone—provided we organize ourselves properly.

One of the key advantages of this new model is the ability to “fight part-time,” with a flexible schedule. Some will be able to make this almost their full-time job in the coming years (and receive combat pay, as provided by the resolution, making it their main income), while others will serve on a “three-day” rotation or even just once a week.

The DFTG air defense model accommodates all these options, giving us a potentially very broad personnel base — from reserved specialists working daytime shifts in defense production who are still ready to stand duty a couple of nights a week to protect their city and factory, to students or retirees who can dedicate much more time to this cause.

So, my dear kitties and bunnies, no one will forge the Iron Hammer over us except ourselves — we’ve been given this opportunity, and it would be a sin to neglect it.

Immediately after reading and sharing this message, let’s write down — call friends, make lists of those willing to volunteer, and estimate who can dedicate how much time to protecting our skies and how regularly.

We’ll also assess who has useful material resources, particularly vehicles, and who can contribute or encourage friends and acquaintances to donate fuel, money for ammunition, and so on.

For those who have registered DFTGs since 2022, it’s time to remember them. For those who haven’t, we are already preparing the paperwork to register new groups.

We have always defeated the enemy through mass popular resistance. We may not be used to it, but now this resistance must extend to the skies.

Just kidding, my dear cats and bunnies — I made up the name Steel Kumpol DFTG and a few others.

Glory to Ukraine, and see you on the hunt!

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