Ukrainian Forces Halt Kremlin’s ‘Territory Exchange’ as Occupier Advance Slows
фото: Генштаб
The speed of the Russian army’s advance in Ukraine has slowed dramatically. Over the past week, Russian troops captured just 75.7 square kilometers — the lowest figure recorded all summer. By comparison, in previous summer weeks, Russian forces typically seized between 92 and 225 square kilometers.
Pokrovsk direction: The enemy’s main advance covered about 32 sq. km; however, the Ukrainian Armed Forces carried out successful counterattacks in the Dobropillya area, regaining approximately 12 sq. km.
Svatovske direction: Russian forces advanced another 20 sq. km, including the capture of the village of Zeleny Gai in the Kharkiv region. Notably, the occupiers had claimed its capture back in July, but footage showing the Russian flag in the settlement was released only recently.
Dnipro region: The General Staff confirms that Ukrainian troops are actively engaged near the villages of Zaporizhzhia and Novogeorgievka, but both settlements remain under Ukrainian control. Reports claiming their occupation by Russian forces are false.
The Kremlin is attempting to use the threat of a breakthrough toward the Dnipro region to increase military and political pressure on the Ukrainian leadership, particularly by expanding the combat zone.
According to Kyrylo Budanov, head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, the region faces a threat along its southeastern front, and fierce battles continue. “However, there is no direct danger to the regional center — the city of Dnipro. The only threats to residents come from missile and drone strikes by the aggressor,” he emphasized.
The enemy has two primary objectives: to establish control over the remaining Ukrainian-held parts of the Donetsk region and to expand the front, particularly toward Dnipro. Additionally, key settlements such as Pokrovsk, Konstantynivka, and Siversk are major targets, with Konstantynivka receiving special attention during the summer offensive.
The situation in the Kostiantynivka direction remains tense, as Russian forces control the dominant heights near Toretsk and Vremenny Yar. This puts the city and its operational rear under flank fire, allowing the enemy to disrupt logistics, including through the use of barrel artillery.
The situation around Toretsk also remains difficult.
Attention should also be paid to increased Russian activity in the Lyman area. While this direction is less covered in the media, it is strategically important.
Another hotspot is the Dvuhletniy area in the Kharkiv region, where Russian forces are expanding their presence, posing a potential threat of further advancement along the Oskol toward the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration.
Russian troops are operating on multiple fronts, but their primary objective remains Konstantinovka, with the potential for a breakthrough toward Druzhkivka and Slovyansk.
However, despite these threats, the prospect of Kostiantynivka falling to Russia is far from certain. The city is a large industrial center, significantly larger than Bakhmut or Vremenny Yar, and its capture would not be straightforward. Occupation forces are facing well-prepared defensive lines and major cities, far more difficult to take than Bakhmut. Consequently, the cost of a new-stage offensive for Russia will be very high.
The Russians understand perfectly well that the “furry beast” crept up not just unexpectedly, but quite expectedly. They understand that the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration is four large industrial cities. Bakhmut was worth 100,000 personnel for them. A similar situation occurred during the battles for Kurakhove. There, the losses of the occupiers amounted, according to various estimates, to 30 thousand personnel. Given these huge losses and the impossibility of compensating them, the Russian Federation is now doing everything possible to minimize such a negative scenario in this direction. But, as we can see, very unsuccessfully. According to the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (GUR MOU), in the Pokrovsk direction alone, the daily losses of the occupiers are up to 500 personnel. These are sanitary and irreparable losses.
However, even if Kostiantynivka were to fall to the occupiers, this would not equate to strategic control over the region. Kostiantynivka is located in a lowland, while Slovyansk and Mount Karachun represent the commanding heights. Moreover, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have been fortifying this area since 2014.
On the approaches to Slovyansk, Ukrainian forces maintain a tactical advantage, making any Russian advance extremely difficult. Even in the long term, the likelihood of Russia securing this part of Donbas is low. Occupying this agglomeration would be virtually impossible without a negotiated surrender of Ukrainian-controlled territories. There is no historical prospect of capturing these areas. One of the key factors halting the Russian offensive has been the successful operations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
It was Ukrainian military successes that prevented the political component of the Russian offensive — the creation of 20-kilometer-deep buffer zones in Kharkiv and Sumy regions — from being implemented. Similar plans for Dnipro were also thwarted. In the Zaporizhzhia direction, Ukrainian forces stabilized the situation after repeated Russian attempts to advance near Malaya Tokmachka, threatening to reach Orikhove. These scenarios were carefully anticipated by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Special attention must be paid to Donbas, where Russia has concentrated its main forces. Beyond military objectives, resource interests are a significant factor.
The occupiers’ primary goal is to seize the industrial centers of Donetsk: Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, and Kostiantynivka. Regarding Pokrovsk, Russian forces are targeting the district for its concentration of minerals. Shevchenko contains lithium deposits, and the Pokrovsk district holds the largest coking coal reserves in Europe, which supply Ukrainian metallurgy. Russian control over the Pokrovsk mine management would reduce the output of metallurgical plants in Zaporizhzhia and Dnipro from 7.5 to 2.5 million tons, resulting in budget shortfalls and social tension in Ukrainian-controlled territories, as these plants employ tens of thousands of Ukrainians.
After occupying Shevchenko and Kotline, Russia applied pressure on Pokrovsk not so much for military gain as for a political objective — to demonstrate to the United States its ability to reach the administrative border of the Dnipro region by force.
At the same time, the political dimension of the slowdown in the Russian offensive should not be overlooked — even representatives of the occupying country acknowledge it. Notably, the Kremlin interprets political pressure from the Trump administration solely as a repetition of previous scenarios. The Russians cite events during the ATO period, specifically Minsk-1 and Minsk-2, as evidence for this reasoning. When Russia reached its maximum advance, Western pressure effectively halted further progress.
It should be emphasized that it was precisely the successful operations of the Ukrainian Defense Forces, combined with international factors, that thwarted Russian plans for the so-called “territory exchange” and the ultimatum directed at the Ukrainian political leadership, as well as their threat of deeper incursions into the industrial areas of Donetsk.
Recent weeks on the front have created new conditions for the international negotiation process aimed at ending the war in Ukraine. This development allows Ukraine, alongside its strategic partners, to advance its own vision of a resolution — one based on the actual line of combat, rather than full Russian control over Donetsk territories.
This is the key takeaway from the events of the past two weeks.
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