The State Defense Committee has published a list of Russian enterprises that supply weapons components: who is on the list

The GUR reported this on Facebook.

Information about the companies was published in the “Military Industrial Complex of the Aggressor” section of the War&Sanctions portal. The list includes companies and scientific organizations that are part of or are under the management of the Roselectronics holding of the Rostec state corporation.

The holding’s enterprises are engaged in the development and production of radio-electronic components and technologies, communication equipment and systems, automated control systems, robotic complexes, ultra-high-frequency electronics, computing equipment, and telecommunications equipment.

Their products are used in a significant part of Russian weapons, including ballistic and cruise missiles, UAVs, electronic warfare (EW) systems, military equipment, radar and communications systems for army, frontline, and strategic aviation.

Which companies are involved in the production of missiles?

Roselectronics includes, in particular, enterprises that participate in cooperation in the production of ballistic missiles 9M723 OTRK “Iskander-M” and 3M22 “Tsirkon”.

Among them:

• • JSC “NDI “Girikond” – manufacturer of precision potentiometers for “Zirkon”;

• • JSC “NYTSEVT” – supplies flight information processing units for ballistic “Iskanders”;

• • JSC “NPP “Integral-V” – produces pulse and heating transformers used in 9M723 missiles.

At the same time, Integral-V is not currently under sanctions by any of the countries of the sanctions coalition. The same situation, according to GUR, concerns almost half of the holding’s enterprises, information about which has now been made public.

At the same time, the presence of “Girikond” and “NYTSEVT” on the sanctions lists of most partner countries did not significantly affect the total production volumes of the respective missiles.

The GUR emphasized that this does not indicate the ineffectiveness of sanctions, but primarily indicates the need to improve mechanisms for monitoring their compliance and strengthen responsibility for violations.

Intelligence notes that components, equipment, software, and critical raw materials should not reach intermediaries and buyers who cannot confirm that the final recipient of the products is an enterprise not associated with the Russian military-industrial complex.

The GUR called for increased control over supply chains to prevent the circumvention of sanctions and the transfer of critical technologies and materials to Russia.