Asymmetric retaliation strategy: why strikes on Russian defense industry plants will replace scarce anti-missile systems.

Recently, the enemy launched another massive attack on Ukraine’s civilian and critical infrastructure. Kyiv and Odesa bore the brunt of the ballistic missiles.

Russia launched a massive combined strike. According to the Ukrainian Air Force, six Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles were launched at the capital.  The explosions in the city occurred before the air raid sirens had even been sounded. This is due to the minimal ballistic time from the Bryansk region (about 7 minutes). 

Due to a critical shortage of Patriot interceptors, none of the six ballistic missiles were shot down; all of them reached their targets or exploded within the city.

Given the shortage of interceptor missiles, Ukraine needs to change its focus: not only ask its partners for new supplies, but also systematically target Russian defense industry enterprises that produce missiles and drones.

Ukraine has sufficient weapons, given that hundreds of drones attack Russian territory every night. If Ukraine can scale up strikes to several hundred UAVs, these capabilities should be concentrated on specific Russian defense industry facilities. An example is the Votkinsk plant, which produces missiles.

The plant is of strategic importance as it is the primary manufacturer of Russian intercontinental and short-range ballistic missile systems. The Votkinsk Plant produces RS-24 Yars intercontinental ballistic missiles and their modifications, R-30 Bulava ballistic missiles for Borei-A submarines, as well as missiles for the Iskander-M missile system and the Kinzhal airborne system, according to the General Staff.

If 400 drones were launched against a single enterprise in a single day, no enemy air defense system, which they practically don’t have, would be able to prevent such a massive strike. And if 1,200 were launched in three days, the plant would cease to exist.

Ukraine must apply  The logic of combined attacks: first, decoy drones that overwhelm air defenses, then attack drones, followed by cruise missiles. This is precisely the approach that should be used against Russian defense industry enterprises.

I would like to draw attention to the limited US capacity to produce Patriot interceptor missiles. If Russia launches approximately 75 missiles in a single large-scale attack, approximately twice as many interceptor missiles are required to intercept them. If such attacks occur twice a month, the requirement could reach approximately 300 interceptor missiles per month.

The annual production of Patriot interceptor missiles is only 600 worldwide: for the US military, strategic partners outside NATO, and the Ukrainian front. We don’t understand this? We probably do.

This is precisely why Ukraine cannot rely solely on awaiting new supplies from the United States to build its defense. Its partners may also question why Ukraine, while possessing its own weapons, isn’t focusing them on Russian missile and drone factories.

As a reminder, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, speaking in the Bundestag, stated that he no longer sees a need to supply Ukraine with Taurus long-range cruise missiles, as Kyiv has achieved significant technological progress and is independently producing effective long-range weapons. Specifically, he noted that the long-range systems being developed by Ukraine are “significantly more effective than the relatively small number of Taurus cruise missiles that Germany could transfer.”

But we demand of our partners: give us the opportunity to hunt for every hypothetical “arrow.” And the cost of one interceptor missile is four million dollars, for the Persian Gulf countries it’s seven million. Our partners also look at us and don’t understand.

Potential targets for strikes include enterprises in Voronezh and Cheboksary, the Kupol drone manufacturing plant in Izhevsk, and the Alabuga special economic zone, where UAV production is being scaled up.

Why are we appealing to the United States and not to our European partners, who also produce anti-ballistic weapons—France and Italy? And why are we only raising this issue in the fifth year of the war? Didn’t we realize we had no counter-ballistic weapons?

I would like to draw special attention to the background of the current problem with air defense. 

 After the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine had one of the most powerful layered air defense systems in the world, but subsequently lost a significant portion of these capabilities.

At the time of the collapse of the USSR and the beginning of the formation of its own Armed Forces in 1991–1992, Ukraine inherited 225 anti-aircraft missile systems. This made the Ukrainian air defense force one of the most powerful in the world at the time.

 The infrastructure included nine anti-aircraft missile brigades. Later, after internal reorganizations, the removal of obsolete systems, and redeployments, by 1997 the air defense shield consisted of 160 anti-aircraft missile battalions.

But under Anatoly Hrytsenko, the former Minister of Defense of Ukraine, all of this was sold off for next to nothing. According to the official findings of the Temporary Investigative Commission (TIC) of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, which investigated embezzlement and the reduction of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ defense potential, dozens of air defense systems and complexes were sold during Hrytsenko’s tenure as the Ministry of Defense (February 2005 – December 2007).

Elements of dozens of ground forces air defense systems and air defense facilities (primarily the Buk-M1, Kub, S-300, and S-125 air defense missile systems) were decommissioned and put up for sale. Along with other types of artillery, a significant portion of the nearly 28,555 air defense and missile systems sold during the 2005–2014 sales period occurred during the Gritsenko ministry, when the residual value of the assets was assessed at reduced rates.

In other words, we’ve disarmed ourselves. Our Western partners understand this perfectly well. And the main question is: why hasn’t Gritsenko been charged yet? That’s the root of the problems. We sold off our air defense systems cheaply. And now we’re complaining that we’ve sold everything off and asking for the ability to shoot down Russian ballistic missiles.

The key question now is why Ukraine’s strike strategy against Russia focuses primarily on oil refineries rather than missile and drone-producing defense industry facilities, especially given the lack of interceptor missiles to defend Ukraine.

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