“Cardboard Maidan” and the Edge of Change: Four Scenarios for Ukraine’s Power Shift

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I have long wondered why the “Cardboard Maidan” targeted NABU and SAPO in particular. Any sociological data pointing to deep public distrust toward these institutions — with a trust-distrust balance of minus 41–43%, according to a March poll by the Razumkov Center — brings this question sharply into focus.

The people did not take to the streets to protest the resignation of their idol, Valeriy Zaluzhny, from the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They did not rise up against the distortions of mobilization. They did not organize mass actions demanding fair rotation at the front. Furthermore, they did not gather outside Bankova Street over large-scale wartime corruption…

And then, suddenly, the Prosecutor General’s oversight of NABU and SAPO is what allegedly suffocated society. That’s when I realized: people came out not for it, but against it. That draft law No. 12414, and the way it was rushed through, became the last straw in the cup of public patience. And the outrage wasn’t aimed at the hastily adopted law, but at the government itself.

At that moment, what I’ve been writing about for the past 1.5–2 years became glaringly obvious: if nothing changes radically, this government is leading us to defeat. And the problem is not NABU or SAPO. The problem is that the government is incapable of implementing radical reforms, and without those reforms, Ukraine is headed for disaster.

Now the question is: how do we carry out a transition of power during a war without losing the state?

Option One. Zelenskyy, like Finnish President Risto Ryti, voluntarily resigns, handing over power to the newly elected Speaker of Parliament, as provided by the Constitution of Ukraine. But there is a fundamental problem: the Ukrainian parliament lacks its own Mannerheim — someone capable of bearing the burden of responsibility for the state and leading Ukraine out of the war, wounded, but alive.

The ideal candidate for such a scenario would be Valeriy Zaluzhny, the undisputed leader of popular support. But… he is not a Member of Parliament, and therefore cannot become Speaker with the prospect of serving as acting president.

Unfortunately, parliamentarism in Ukraine has degraded to the point where the Verkhovna Rada is composed largely of either no-names or political dinosaurs with sky-high anti-ratings. There are, of course, some respectable MPs from the second echelon of Ukrainian politics. But it’s difficult to imagine, for example, Serhiy Rakhmanin or Roman Kostenko as acting president, with all my sincere respect to them.

So, a constitutional reshuffle — as happened in 2014 — would most likely result in a loss of control over the state, leading to chaos and collapse. We rehearsed that scenario 11 years ago under Turchynov, when we lost Crimea and part of Donbas.

As a sub-option, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine could form a “government of national unity,” which would become the primary political actor in the country. However, it is unclear how a politically impotent parliament could form a strong and authoritative government. Who would be the prime minister? And what would be the relationship between the prime minister and the acting president? Who would effectively coordinate the security and defense forces?

Those old enough will recall how the “first Yatsenyuk government” was formed in February 2014, and back then, the parliament had far more politically mature figures.

Option Two. Trump and Xi reach an agreement on a new global architecture. Under threat of losing China’s economic and technological support, Russia reluctantly agrees to a ceasefire along the current front line. The United States and China act as guarantors of the truce. This opens the way for national elections, the selection of a new head of state, and a reboot of the Ukrainian parliament.

The fundamental issue with this scenario is how long it might take Trump and Xi to negotiate — and whether they will reach an agreement at all. It remains uncertain whether Ukraine, given its current leadership and deep structural problems both at the front and in the rear, can endure for years while waiting for such an outcome.

Option Three. A Ukrainian de Gaulle. The release of the so-called “Mindich tapes” undermines the president’s legitimacy. Mass protests resume with renewed intensity. The parliament proves unable to assume full responsibility for the state. The front begins to collapse.

At that point, one of the popular military commanders — invoking the need to save Ukrainian statehood — stages a coup d’état.

If popular commanders manage to form an informal coalition or at least conclude a non-aggression pact, as well as effectively communicate the necessity of a change of power through a formally extra-legal process to our partners, the operation may succeed. Moreover, the state could rapidly transform into an effective ecosystem, optimized for conducting modern warfare, like the most advanced military organisms that have long outgrown the conventional structures of traditional military units.

If the military leaders fail to reach an agreement among themselves, a coup d’état will lead to the ruin and collapse of Ukrainian statehood. If they do not promptly demonstrate a new level of political maturity and governance, the initial public trust will be lost, which will once again result in chaos and destruction.

Option Four. Leave everything as it is. In other words, convince yourself that the chronic illness of Ukrainian statehood will somehow resolve itself. The West will continue to provide funding. The powerful will continue to steal. And those who have voluntarily or involuntarily donned camouflage will indefinitely hold back the Russian offensive.

However, for some reason, it seems to me that the “cardboard Maidan” symbolizes the fact that the status quo cannot continue. Simply passing Bill No. 13533 will not be enough to turn life around.

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