Votes for Sale? Why Digital Elections Are Impossible in Wartime Ukraine
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Let’s be clear: in modern Ukraine, online elections are completely impossible in any form — with Diia or without it — there is no way. That’s the bottom line.
And now, a broader perspective.
No country in the world — except Estonia (more on that separately) — has ever successfully organized a fully functioning online election that meets all democratic standards. None. There are many challenges, but here are the most obvious:
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Ensuring the secrecy of the vote is practically impossible.
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Ensuring voting is free from coercion is really impossible.
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Conducting a transparent and verifiable recount of votes is extremely difficult or outright impossible — for example, if the “losing” political force disputes the results.
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There are enormous risks of unauthorized interference in the electronic election system.
Who could forget the most high-profile hacks of recent years, starting with Medko and Prykarpattyaoblenergo, continuing with the hack of Diia in 2022, the Ministry of Justice registries, and culminating in the epic collapse of Kyivstar?
Some of the elements mentioned above can be implemented individually. However, even in Estonia, it is impossible to meet all of these requirements simultaneously.
And now, regarding “heavenly Estonia.”
They began preparing for the possibility of online voting back in the mid-1990s. The first e-elections were held in 2005 under the careful supervision of the European Union. To enable this, the country adopted two laws and numerous bylaws regulating virtually every detail. All political parties signed a memorandum on e-elections, along with many other internal documents.
The first e-elections were relatively successful. Yet over the years that followed, the system faced enormous challenges. Colossal sums have been invested over more than 30 years to enable remote voting. The system underwent repeated tests of security, functionality, capacity, reliability, and other operational factors. The world’s top experts and scientists — from both the IT and cybersecurity fields — were involved. The number of public and private discussions on the system is simply incalculable.
As a result, it is the only country in the world that holds elections completely online. About half of voters vote online, give or take.
I would like to emphasize that Estonia’s system does not allow for a “mobile application” on voters’ smartphones, as this would pose extreme risks to the information security of the voters themselves.
The entire system operates through a special card reader issued by the police (yes, in person, with a physical passport). Voters insert their ID card, which contains a cryptographic chip, into the card reader, connect it to a computer or laptop, and then log in to a dedicated government website. There, they authenticate with their ID and can access a range of electronic government services — including voting in elections.
Of course, Estonia’s system is not perfect. Its strength lies less in the technical solution itself and more in the country’s high political culture and trust in public authorities — something Ukraine does not yet possess and is far from achieving.
I’ve written about all of this probably twenty times over the past 5 years. And I’ve said even more on various airwaves, in interviews, and in commentaries.
The obsession with online elections won’t die.
So let’s state it clearly once more: Ukraine is essentially nowhere near ready.
Technically, the closest thing Ukraine has is the “Diia” infrastructure, which is completely incapable of handling them, not for e-elections, and not even for something as minor as electing a condominium association head. I have written extensively on this issue and will continue to do so.
Legally, e-elections are completely undefined. Implementing them would require thousands, if not tens of thousands, of pages of laws, provisions, regulations, technical requirements, decrees, instructions, technology selection criteria, and countless other details. Nobody has even started this work, simply because there is no one in power capable.
Organizationally, the situation is equally dire. A dedicated institution would be needed to develop the concept and implement e-elections, and no such organization exists.
Financially, the picture is the same: zero. All the above would require substantial funding.
And finally, the Constitution of Ukraine provides no possibility for remote voting — neither by mail nor online. Amending the Constitution during martial law is explicitly prohibited (Article 157).
In other words, if you think rationally and logically, there’s no point in even bringing up this topic. But when has common sense ever prevailed in Ukraine’s leadership in recent years? Our “clever quarterbacks” can ram a stick through the Constitution, logic, and even the laws of physics — and push a crooked “permission for e-elections in the Diaspora” through parliament.
If that happens, it will only mean one thing: the government will falsify the elections. I would even say 1000% — though, of course, percentages cannot exceed 100.
Our Western partners will not recognize such a farce either, and if it is forced through, they will refuse to accept the results.
Therefore, my prediction is clear: Ukraine will have no online elections for at least ten years, and probably much longer.
First, we would need someone truly competent in power. Even in that optimistic scenario — even with Estonia’s experience, the world’s most advanced systems, and inspired 24/7 work — test systems might realistically be launched only in 15–20 years. But that’s me being hopeful.
Perhaps in 15–20 years, some countries like Finland or Denmark will manage it. Ukraine? Not anytime soon.
If they want to at all – because for now, it seems like they’re fine with it.
Without these e-elections of yours.
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