“New blood” or a forced move? Why did Drapatiy lead the Armed Forces of Ukraine at the peak of public protests?

The Commander of the Joint Forces Group, Major General Mykhailo Drapatiy, became the new Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, replacing Oleksandr Syrsky.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced this in his evening video address on July 21. “I have determined that Mykhailo Drapaty will become the new Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine , “ he said.

In turn, Drapatiy thanked “the president for his trust, the Minister of Defense for his support, and the Defense Forces for a new stage of service . “ 

Mykhailo Drapaty is a strong-willed, energetic person who is not afraid to take responsibility. I have known the general in absentia since 2014, when he provided operational support for hostilities in the Luhansk region.

Drapatiy showed himself there with lightning speed. In August 2014, Drapatiy’s unit found itself in a dense ring of fire on the border in Luhansk region under constant shelling from the territory of the Russian Federation. Having shown personal initiative and taken responsibility, Drapatiy successfully withdrew 260 fighters and more than 30 units of military equipment from the encirclement, overcoming a distance of 160 kilometers under enemy fire.

He is a real combat officer who has gone through all the stages from the very bottom. He understands perfectly what the Armed Forces of Ukraine are, the structure itself, its pros and cons.

Drapatiy has repeatedly proven himself as a crisis manager.

Immediately after the start of the Russian Federation’s repeated massive offensive in the north of the Kharkiv region, Brigadier General Drapaty was appointed commander of the Kharkiv Operational-Tactical Group of Forces (OTF). Under his leadership, the Defense Forces were able to quickly stop the advance of Russian troops in the area of Vovchansk and Lyptsi, completely disrupting the enemy’s strategic plans for a deep breakthrough. 

In addition, there was the Pokrovsk direction, where Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensives and slowed down the pace of the Russian advance. Under his strategic leadership, the Defense Forces conducted a number of local counteroffensives that significantly slowed down the movement of the occupation troops and prevented a rapid breakthrough directly to Pokrovsk.

And this speaks volumes about his organizational skills.

At the same time, the new Commander-in-Chief will have to work in a difficult situation at the front. The biggest challenges are currently concentrated in the Donetsk region – in the Kostyantynivka, Lymansky and now Sloviansk directions, where the situation is deteriorating.

However, Drapaty’s effectiveness will depend not only on his personal qualities. The main question is whether the new Chief Commander will be allowed to form his own team and make the necessary changes to the General Staff, the system of planning and direct control of combat operations.

A separate factor is possible informational and political attacks. Both Valeriy Zaluzhny and Oleksandr Syrsky have previously faced them, regardless of the effectiveness of their work.

It is worth noting that personnel decisions regarding Commanders-in-Chief were often made not for military reasons, but solely for political reasons. That is why it is important for Drapatom to be given enough authority so that his hands are not tied by external pressure and public campaigns.

I would like to draw your attention to the possible appointment of Yevheniy Khmara as Minister of Defense. The appearance of a representative of the special services at the head of the defense department could create a separate center of influence and become a kind of counterweight to the new Commander-in-Chief.

The system, in which there are several centers of influence, was used back in the days of Leonid Kuchma. One influential figure is balanced by another, so the appointment of Khmara can be seen as a counterweight to Drapatom. If an SBU general is appointed, this means an increase in the capabilities of the special services. However, what is the relationship between the SBU and the Ministry of Defense? This is a completely different functionality.

In this context, I am skeptical about Mykhailo Fedorov’s future prospects. I assume that the former Minister of Defense could have been used to escalate the conflict with Syrsky, but there are no plans to return him to his post.

Fedorov now doesn’t understand why he’s not being returned to the position of minister. Because he was used — and that’s it. His task was to torpedo Syrsky, nothing more. If a person hasn’t understood his function in six months, what he was appointed for, that’s a question directly for Fedorov.

Constant changes in the leadership of the Ministry of Defense do not contribute to stable work. Each new head of the department brings his own team, which needs time to understand the functionality and establish interaction with the military command.

The fifth Minister of Defense during this period has in no way created normal working relations within the ministry itself. Each minister brings his own team, which even in wartime conditions needs at least a month or two to get up to speed. This is another problem that Drapatiy may face.

I assess the change in military leadership against the backdrop of “cardboard” protests more than critically. Attempts to explain personnel decisions as a response to street sentiment may dilute the responsibility of the authorities themselves. 

Playing democracy — “ we heard the street” — in wartime is detrimental to the state. Drapatom is actually being made to understand, using the example of Syrsky, that he depends on the mood of the street. It seems that further personnel decisions will be made taking into account the mood of the Ukrainian people. But this is actually a leveling or shifting of responsibility: they say, we did not demand Syrsky’s resignation.

In my opinion, further events will show what was really behind the appointment of the new Chief of Staff: a real strengthening of defense capabilities or a hidden “witch hunt.”

I wish Drapatom patience above all. He is a truly positive person, but I am worried about him.

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