OSINT or Online Noise? Why War Analysis Has Become a Spectacle

We live in an era where just a few minutes on social media can make us feel like we “understand” what is happening on the front lines. A red or gray zone on a map, a Telegram message, a short video with a flag—and it seems as if the verdict is already in. Yet, it is precisely this illusion of instant understanding that I believe represents one of the greatest dangers of modern warfare.

In a recent comment to the Voice of Crimea Information Agency, I said it, and I will say it again: unconditional trust in OSINT—open-source intelligence—can turn into a strategic illusion. And in wartime, such an illusion works against us.

“Open source” is a keyword that is too often overlooked.

Let’s start with the basics. OSINT is the collection, analysis, and use of information from publicly available, open sources. And herein lies the main problem: an open source does not mean reliable. On the contrary, in most cases, it is unverified, fragmented, and lacking operational context.

There is no basis for claiming absolute reliability for information released into the public domain. And it is precisely this factor that the occupying country’s intelligence services systematically exploit for disinformation and psychological operations.

It is not just Ukrainian society that is under attack—military command is under attack as well. The enemy is exploiting not only mistakes but also our mistrust of official statements, a mistrust that has, unfortunately, been building for years, since 2014.

The Making of a “Success” on the Map

The mechanics are simple. The occupying country’s intelligence services broadcast messages about supposed tactical successes on a particular front line. OSINT analysts, working quickly, record these signals and transfer them to interactive maps.

These maps often take on a life of their own. Cited by Ukrainian and European media, debated on television and social media, they are frequently treated as fact, all too often without any verification of the reality on the ground.

Over the past few weeks, Ukrainian Defense Forces press officers have repeatedly had to refute reports from certain OSINT resources and media outlets. To be blunt, I am referring to DeepState and several Western media organizations, in particular the reporting of the so-called “war correspondent” Julian Röpke of Bild.

These denials have concerned the current situation in the Kupyansk, Limansk, Pokrovsk, and Hulyai-Polye directions, as well as in the Sumy region—in fact, along virtually the entire length of the Russian-Ukrainian front.

The most recent example comes from Southern Defense Forces spokesman Vladislav Voloshin, who told Interfax-Ukraine that the village of Rybne in the Zaporizhia region remains a gray zone: enemy forces are unable to deploy reinforcements there, and Ukrainian forces are being instructed not to occupy the destroyed village.

As a reminder, on January 20, the DeepState analytical project reported that Russian occupation forces had captured the village of Rybne in the Zaporizhzhia region.

It is worth noting that when such errors become widespread and geographically cover almost the entire battlefield, they can no longer be dismissed as random mistakes or the “fog of war.” This clearly exhibits the hallmarks of a systemic problem—and in information warfare, systemic errors always work to the enemy’s advantage.

“Flagovtyk” is not a meme but an element of IPSO.

Let me focus on what I term the “flag-waving tactic.” It may seem primitive, but it is surprisingly effective.

Currently, the occupiers are employing small assault groups that infiltrate urban areas, covertly advance, and then consolidate to disrupt and disorganize the local defense.

In practice, it works like this: two to eight Russian soldiers enter a Ukrainian-controlled urban area, unfurl a Russian flag, film a short video in front of an administrative building, and immediately transmit it for publication in the media and on social media.

Within minutes, these so-called FPV drones, or Ukrainian attack aircraft, usually eliminate these “flag bearers.”

The fate of these “flag bearers” receives little attention from OSINT analysts. Meanwhile, the same analysts have already marked the zone as coded red or gray on the map, interpreting it as either occupied or uncontrolled territory. The information then spreads rapidly through the media. In this way, a minor tactical episode with no real military significance becomes a “news fact.”

The Psychological Trap of Excuses

Next, the key element of Russian IPSO comes into play: coercion into justification. When the narrative that “the city is a complete gray zone” enters the information space, the General Staff and units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces are compelled to respond. Any denial is immediately framed as a sign of weakness.

The logic of this propaganda is straightforward: if you are making excuses, you must be hiding something. This is the essence of information pressure, and it is precisely why OSINT without critical analysis becomes an ideal tool for the enemy.

When Ukrainian OSINT Works Against Ukraine

There are two particularly dangerous points.

First, media reports citing OSINT resources force military leadership to react, as operational reserves are redeployed to the reported sections of the front.

Second, politicians and media in the occupying country are using reports from Ukrainian OSINT resources for external audiences. The formula is familiar: “We’re not saying this—Ukrainian analysts are reporting it.”

As a result, Ukrainian maps and assessments are beginning to undermine Ukraine internationally and to impose Russia’s narrative of the situation on its partners.

In war, information is a weapon—regardless of who spreads it or what their intentions are.

Historical Parallel: Eleanor Roosevelt and the “Risk Response”

U.S. intelligence officials contacted her the day after publication, warning that the information might aid the enemy in planning operations. She responded simply by apologizing and ceasing further publications.

The Ukrainian discourse on OSINT, however, presents a very different picture; when military leadership tries to outline the risks or set guidelines, some members of the public perceive it as “pressure” or an “attempt to restrict work.”

Why comparing the situation to Russia is uncomfortable yet illuminating

I often ask a simple question: Have you seen independent OSINT analysts in Russia? No, they haven’t. There’s criminal liability for “discrediting the army.”

Article 207.3 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation provides for liability for the public dissemination “under the guise of reliable reports of knowingly false information containing data on the use of the armed forces of the Russian Federation for the purpose of protecting the interests of the Russian Federation and its citizens.”

Article 280.3 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation provides for liability “for public acts aimed at discrediting the use of the armed forces of the Russian Federation for the purpose of protecting the interests of the Russian Federation and its people.”

Ukraine remains an open society even during war. And that’s precisely what makes us vulnerable.
My point is not to impose restrictions or create a “ministry of truth,” but to raise awareness of the risks involved.

How to distinguish analysis from noise

There are simple markers. If the analysis is based solely on information from open sources and videos, using Russian flags isn’t analysis. If it systematically anticipates official General Staff announcements and shapes the agenda, that’s not observation, but influence. From a professional perspective, this is known as “active operations” in the information environment to shape public perception…”

Why can’t we control war?

OSINT is an auxiliary tool. It cannot and should not replace professional military analysis and intelligence. The greatest danger arises when a country is pressured into making decisions under the pressure of information campaigns, emotions, and the volume of expletives.

The Avdiivka incident in 2024 was illustrative: information pressure on military decisions is a direct path to disorganization.

My conclusion is simple. In a war where a video of a flag can be part of an information operation, and a gray area on a map is just a fragment without context, trusting OSINT can’t be a matter of faith. It must be a cold, critical, and responsible investigation.

The illusion of knowledge in times of war is more dangerous than ignorance.

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