Franko’s Stage as a Political Arena: A Theatrical Turn in Ukraine’s Civic Discourse

Source: Author’s Facebook page

Any revolutionary — or proto-/pseudo-revolutionary — movement unfolds according to recognizable structural patterns. Its ultimate effectiveness hinges not on rhetoric or spontaneity, but on the presence, resilience, and coherence of its underlying institutional frameworks.

What are the essential elements of a political movement?
An idea (or ideology), a leader, an organizational structure, time, money, international support, a defined adversary, and the presence—or absence—of traitors on the opposing side.

What do we have at this moment?

To begin with, the gun shown in the first act is expected to fire (though not necessarily in the final one).

For the past year and a half, Ukrainian politics has operated within the logic of elections. From a purely political science perspective, these public speeches are a natural extension of that logic. A society cannot dwell in the mindset of elections indefinitely without eventually acting within that framework. This is neither inherently good nor bad—it’s simply how the genre works. Most protesters will sincerely say: We’re not here because of the elections. And yet, a year and a half of living in election mode inevitably demands corresponding behavior. That’s human nature.

Idea.
People with widely differing ideologies have gathered, but what unites them—above all—is their shared opposition to the current government (again, returning us to the logic of elections). At the same time, the ideological spectrum represented on the square is remarkably broad. The only consistent trigger, albeit often vague or subconscious, appears to be dissatisfaction with the state of anti-corruption institutions, particularly NABU and SAPO.

At this stage, the main unifying theme seems to be the ongoing fight against corruption, seen as a key step toward EU integration. Whether this idea will evolve remains unclear. My view is that such transformation is most likely to begin within the more radical segments of the protest.

Leader.
There is no single, widely recognized leader, and it seems unlikely one will emerge in the near term. The political forces involved are simply too divergent. While some prominent figures have gained visibility (and are leveraging the situation for political capital), none of them convincingly embody the anti-corruption message in a way that would earn the trust of a broad public. No one, as yet, can credibly say, “I will defeat corruption” and be widely believed.

Structure.
The movement’s core consists of supporters from a faction of the Holos party (often labeled as anti-corruption activists) and the European Solidarity party. Despite the level of coordination observed so far, it is far too early to speak of a formal political alliance. However, it is reasonable to expect some movement in that direction over time.

Regarding the large number of young people
It is worth noting that youth played a prominent role in both 2004 and 2013–2014. Today is no exception. However, what stands out now is a noticeable demographic imbalance: for obvious reasons, there are very few middle-aged men (aged 35–55) participating in the protest.

Time and money
There is an abundance of the former, while the latter is largely unnecessary—at least for the goals the protesters are currently pursuing.

International support
It is less visible and less proactive than the protesters would prefer. Much will depend on the scale of public mobilization and how the government responds.

The enemy
At this stage, the image of “the enemy” is still taking shape. However, it appears likely that the protest will target figures within President Zelenskyy’s inner circle, though not the President himself, but rather key individuals around him.

Traitors on the opposite side
This issue has not emerged yet because no one is attempting to overthrow the government or storm Bankova Street. The protest, at least for now, does not frame its demands in terms of regime change.

Looking ahead
Sociological data over the next week or two will be telling. For now, we face a paradox: around 70% of Ukrainians identify corruption as the country’s main problem, yet 62–64% do not trust the anti-corruption institution that has become the focal point of the protest. Additionally, only a small minority of Ukrainians are currently willing to support explicitly political demands during wartime.

As a result, it appears likely that the authorities will make certain concessions. The protest movement may gradually lose momentum, but the core issue—the widespread lack of public trust in the government’s commitment to fighting corruption—will remain a central political fault line. This applies across the entire political spectrum.

These demonstrations, regrettably, are not a culmination but a prologue to the political turbulence that awaits Ukraine after the war. This environment may well become fertile ground for the rise of “dark horses”—unexpected political figures or forces.

We now have a window of opportunity to audit the roots of corruption and reflect on why the existing anti-corruption infrastructure is failing. International partners could play a role here, offering both support and fresh ideas for reform.

But instead, we continue to operate in a mindset typical of football fans—more eager to rally against the opponent than to admit that our team is playing poorly. And so, we are setting ourselves up for future waves of protest.

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