Russia Prepares a Spring Offensive: The Directions of the Next Strike Are Already Clear

Source: Author’s Facebook page
The Russian command is beginning to ration its reserves. This is not caution—it is a clear sign that Moscow is stockpiling forces for a new offensive.

The enemy has obviously ALREADY begun preparing for this year’s summer campaign. Therefore, personally, I see no point in discussing what everyone calls the “peace process.” Its course, content, and even more so any timeframe…

Relatively speaking, “everything will revolve around” two possible (hypothetical) offensive operations by Russian troops, the beginning of which can be expected starting at the end of April 2026.

With a high degree of probability, they can (conditionally) become:
– Slavyansko-Kramatorska
– Orekhovo-Zaporizhzhya

Well, or a combination of them, “in terms of time and place.” In this regard, by the end of spring, the Russian command will be busy with several preparations for this campaign.

– Formation and deployment of strategic reserves
– Accumulation of material and technical resources at the operational and strategic levels in the relevant areas
– Preliminary occupation of starting (“starting”) areas and lines for the operational deployment of the relevant strike groups of troops.
– Carrying out a set of measures to comprehensively cover this type of deployment (starting with air defense and ending with counterintelligence measures and electronic warfare)
– Conducting covert operational-strategic regrouping of forces and assets in accordance with the plan and schedule of operational deployment of designated groups

At this point, it is clear that the Russian command is encountering its greatest difficulties with Task No. 3. Enemy units assigned to carry it out appear to be stalled within the tactical zone in the relevant directions. The pace of their advance clearly falls short of the rigid, pre-set timelines allocated for the execution of this task.
But, at the same time, the Russian command “is not particularly eager” to use its strategic reserves (which it has been carefully and diligently trying to accumulate since the end of last fall) to accelerate its implementation.

And this is quite understandable, because in this case, the chances of successfully carrying out the same offensive operations I mentioned above in the spring-summer of this year could be significantly reduced…

It remains to be seen how the Russian command will attempt to resolve this strategic “dilemma.” It may choose to postpone the deadlines, or it may risk launching the next phase of its so-called “strategic offensive” using only the forces and assets already committed to its deployed groupings. Alternatively, it may decide to bring its reserves into play in the near future.
In this context, I would view the participation of representatives of the Russian military-political leadership—the current Kremlin regime—in the so-called “peace process” solely as an attempt to provide foreign-policy cover for their actual plans for this year’s summer campaign.

In a broader sense, the Kremlin will obviously make another (and, quite likely, the last in this war) attempt this year to “end it by force” on the terms it wants…

If it breaks like the previous one…

We will actually get a REAL chance to end the war.

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