The Danger of a Ceasefire Illusion: Why Ukraine Can’t Afford a ‘War Freeze’

Source: Author’s Facebook page

“Be realistic — demand the impossible!” — the rallying cry of the 1968 student revolution perfectly captures a sentiment that remains largely unspoken in Ukrainian society, now entering the fourth year of the great war.

The reality is that when the goal in war shifts from defeating the enemy to simply “ending the war” through a “compromise,” both victory and even the much-desired compromise become virtually impossible.

After emotional swings — from the fear that “they’re going to kill us all” to moments of savoring Yalta coffee — and following a prolonged period of largely unsuccessful fighting (unsuccessful for us, though not much better for the enemy), the exhausted Ukrainian society has lost confidence in the possibility of victory, even though, objectively, it remains achievable.

A ceasefire along the current front line, which would de facto acknowledge the loss of occupied territories, reward the aggressor instead of punishing crime, and offer no prospect of reparations, has begun to seem, for some, not a terrifying scenario (as it truly is), but a lesser evil — and for others, almost a dream outcome, a kind of ersatz victory.

I could go on at length about why this scenario is never a “lesser evil,” let alone something we should aspire to. But that is not the point.

Even if we were to imagine that a rapid “freezing” of the war along the current front line is truly what we need (which it is not — quite the opposite), the main problem with this scenario is that, by its very goal, it is deliberately unrealistic. The objective of “stopping the war” is not only shameful and unwise, but fundamentally unattainable.

War involves two sides. When both sides set victory as their goal — a real, decisive victory in which the enemy is defeated and the victor dictates the terms of surrender — an unpleasant but sometimes necessary compromise may arise, forced by circumstances.

But if one side aims for victory and the total defeat of the enemy, while the other deliberately does not even seek victory, instead defining the achievement of a compromise as its maximum goal, and considers it a triumph merely to persuade the enemy to stop at what has already been gained, then compromise becomes impossible. The first party neither needs it nor offers any incentive.

What motivation could make Putin stop? Only one: the threat that he will lose the war tomorrow — a war he himself has defined as existential. In that case, accepting the current gains and bargaining for relatively favorable peace terms becomes the only way to avoid shameful defeat and punishment.

Does he have any similar motivation now? Of course not.

On the contrary, the position of the West and Ukraine’s own follow-up efforts, focused on “stopping the war,” encourages him to continue both the offensive at the front and the destruction of Ukraine’s rear.

After all, they are signaling that no one intends to defeat or punish him. All they demand is that he stop — stop the killing.

From the perspective of a criminal, such a “generous offer” does not incentivize halting the crime; on the contrary, it encourages continuing it for as long as possible. After all, even if he does not stop, he faces no consequences for what he has already done. Why, then, should he stop “here and now”?

It is entirely rational for the Kremlin to continue its aggressive war as long as resources are available — and there are still some in reality, while in the Kremlin’s imagination they are likely infinite (which they are not, but that is another story). Only when — or if — these resources run out will they consider returning to the “generous offer” of freezing the conflict.

If the Kremlin’s timing is favorable, the war could continue until our defeat: the collapse of the front (not so unrealistic given the failed mobilization policy), a Russian advance to the Dnieper, and our surrender on terms that would make the Istanbul Agreement look like a pact of friendship and mutual assistance.

If the situation worsens, Putin will still agree to “freeze” the conflict on terms that include amnesty and the lifting of sanctions — but not now. He will do so only when his army finally loses the ability to advance and occupy new territory, and when his air and missile forces, for whatever reason, can no longer bombard our cities. That moment may arrive in six months, a year, two, or three — the exact timing does not concern him.

What matters to him is that, in either case, he risks nothing. This absence of risk stems from a strategically flawed goal: the foolish desire to reconcile with the aggressor instead of defeating him.

Even if, in our hearts, we have resigned ourselves to the necessity of an unpleasant, painful compromise, there remains one more requirement: to compel the opposing side to accept the very idea of compromise.

And however you look at it, the only way to achieve that is to make the complete defeat of the occupation army our declared objective — an unmistakable military defeat of the Russian Federation; the liberation of occupied territories; the reduction of the Russian armed forces to an incapable state; and the erosion of Moscow’s control over territory and population.

This must be our goal. Strategy and tactics at every level should be built around it, and the timing of operations and the allocation of resources should be calculated to serve it.

The schedule is blunt and simple.

We will pursue the “impossible” — Victory. We will either achieve it (and yes, it is possible) or, at worst, secure a forced, painful, but tolerable compromise.

If we settle for compromise as our goal, we will inevitably suffer a cruel defeat. Wrong objectives lead to defeat; we are witnessing that now.

So let us work for Victory with everything we have, and demand nothing less of our government.

Be realistic — demand the impossible. Not mere “coffee in Yalta,” but a Victory Parade on Red Square with the Kremlin’s ruins as a backdrop. This is not fantasy; it is the only realistic way to end the war.

Whether a settlement comes along the current front line, on the 1991 borders, or as far east as the Volga and the Urals is for strategists to debate — but never along the Dnieper, the Zbruch, or the Western Bug.

We have made the “impossible” possible before. We must do it again, however exhausted we are.

Glory to Ukraine.

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