“Ukraine has fallen into a ‘perfect labyrinth’ of traps,” says Vitaly Portnikov

Last week, it became known that there had been private contacts between Ukraine and Russia related to negotiations to end the war. Furthermore, on June 4, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy published an open letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin, also calling for an end to the war. Renowned Ukrainian journalist and publicist Vitaly Portnikov discusses the prospects of the negotiation process, the risk of a Russian invasion of the Baltic states, and the possibility of a coup within Russia.

Host: Mr. Portnikov, welcome. The prospects for ending the war, at least its “hot” phase, are being actively discussed today. Recently, Kirill Budanov stated that President Zelenskyy has called for every effort to end active hostilities by winter. We’ve seen joint photos of the country’s leadership, and visits by American officials have been announced. Can we assume that the negotiating process has truly intensified? And how reasonable are the expectations of a compromise solution?

Vitaly Portnikov: In recent years, I’ve been constantly explaining: any steps to end the Russian-Ukrainian war are not Kyiv’s responsibility, but Moscow’s. We want to end the war by February 2022. President Zelenskyy and other Ukrainian officials have been talking every few weeks about the possibility of ending the war with the participation of American mediators. Zelenskyy has stated that they will arrive when the Middle East issue is resolved, but right now, the situation is at an impasse.

For negotiations involving the US to truly work, Washington must have real leverage over both Moscow and Kyiv. Currently, such opportunities are lacking. Donald Trump hoped to pressure Russia over oil prices and energy sanctions, but licenses for the sale of offshore Russian oil remain in place. If the war continues and the Strait of Hormuz remains blocked, the United States will not only renew these licenses but also allow Russia to sell new oil to maintain the illusion of balance.

Regarding Ukraine, the US also has no ability to pressure us. We were dependent on American weapons, but now the US has expended a significant number of Patriot missiles in the conflict in the Middle East, where they are desperately needed by our allies in the Persian Gulf countries.

The question then arises: what compromises are we talking about? Moscow has clearly stated its condition: “We will resume negotiations when the troops withdraw from Donbas.” This isn’t a condition for dialogue; it’s a way to forget about it. Kyiv isn’t obligated to make unpopular concessions because Trump has nothing to offer.

When commenting on such statements, it’s worth asking ourselves: why do we believe these forecasts are accurate? All parties to the conflict have made mistakes in their assessments more than once. Are there objective conditions for ending the war today? No. They can only arise with the intensive destruction of Russia’s military-industrial and oil refining potential.

If this continues, conditions for a ceasefire may eventually emerge, as they did in the US-Iran war – a situation of prolonged “freeze” or intense missile strikes without changing the front line.

Host: Speaking of Russia’s potential, is there a risk of it opening a “second front” against the Baltic states? Military analysts say Russia’s resources are already deployed in Ukraine, so an offensive is out of the question. Do you agree?

Vitaly Portnikov: I agree that there won’t be a full-scale attack on the Baltic states or Poland. But we can’t rule out shelling of military installations or provocations with drones. This worries Europeans even more than the threat of a ground invasion.

This changes psychology: when a resident of Riga or Tallinn realizes that a plane could fly right to them, it’s a completely different story. Many democratic politicians fear such actions because Russia is a nuclear state, and they do everything to prevent war from coming to their soil. These are the rules of electoral politics in any country.

If Ukraine were not a party to the conflict, and the war were taking place, say, in Belarus, Ukrainians would react the same way as Poles or Romanians do now: “We condemn aggression, but we don’t want to be participants.”

Host: You mentioned Armenia. Putin threatened it with a “Ukrainian scenario” if it chose the European path. Can Russia take any real steps, given the presence of a Russian base there?

Vitaly Portnikov: The Russian base in Armenia is not a force capable of influencing the political process. After Azerbaijan restored its territorial integrity, Russia was left with only economic instruments and attempts to deploy pro-Russian figures.

But sociology points to deep disillusionment with Moscow among Armenian society. Even those who espouse pro-Russian slogans are genuinely afraid of being left face-to-face with regional players without Russia’s “protection,” but they no longer believe in it as a friendly country.

The war in Ukraine has thwarted Moscow’s plans to exploit ethnic conflicts in the region, and now Armenia and Azerbaijan are trying to find their own way.

Host: Is a coup possible within Russia due to the economic disappointment of the elites?

Vitaly Portnikov: I don’t see any reason for that. Russia is a state where the special services have a monopoly. The struggle between the FSB, the FSO, and the army continues historically, but they have no fundamental disagreement: Russia must remain within the borders of the former USSR.

Putin’s death won’t change the situation because there is no alternative to forceful rule. For that to happen, a revolution is needed, and there are no preconditions for that yet.

Host: Is it true that the Ukraine issue will be put on hold until the crisis with Iran is resolved?

Vitaly Portnikov: If the Strait of Hormuz remains blocked, it will lead to an energy crisis that will make all other wars simply disappear. We can’t even imagine the scale of the economic collapse that could await us by the end of 2026.

Ukraine has fallen into a “perfect labyrinth” of traps. The only way out is to systematically weaken the aggressors’ potential. But authoritarian regimes have a higher threshold of public tolerance than democratic countries.

Ultimately, we must get used to the fact that there will be no “peace agreement” between Russia and Ukraine in the coming decades. There will be a ceasefire with occasional escalations. And we will be fortunate if we manage to achieve such a format instead of endless war.

Host: What kind of world will Europe live in?

Vitaly Portnikov: It’s complicated. If the war can’t be frozen, it will spread to Europe. Russia could begin striking European military targets to force the EU to abandon its support for Ukraine.

The most dangerous period will be 2027-2028, when Putin can be confident that the West will not respond to attacks with force.

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