Not Another Budapest: What the U.S. Security Guarantees for Ukraine Are Really Worth

As negotiations to end the war enter a more technical phase, U.S., Ukrainian, and European officials report progress on security guarantees for Kyiv, raising renewed debate over the credibility and enforceability of such commitments.

In particular, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that the United States had “made significant progress” in negotiations on Ukraine, while warning that “there is still a long way to go.”

At the same time, statements about Washington’s readiness to provide Ukraine with military security guarantees in the event of a renewed attack by the occupying power have triggered a wave of scepticism within Ukrainian society. Are these real commitments, or merely another political formula without an enforcement mechanism?

I am convinced that this time the discussion is not about intentions, but about a concrete deterrence model—one that Washington has already applied in other regions of the world.

The fundamental difference of the current U.S. proposals lies in their clearly defined military component. This is not limited to intelligence sharing, training, or military-technical assistance, as European politicians have often suggested. It concerns guarantees underpinned by the nuclear status of the United States.

That is why comparisons with the Budapest Memorandum are misplaced. In that case, Ukraine relinquished its nuclear arsenal in exchange for political assurances that proved unenforceable.

Ukraine received political assurances without a coercive enforcement mechanism. By contrast, the United States is now offering a model that effectively mirrors NATO’s Article 5—without formal accession to the Alliance.

Particular attention should be paid to the role of Europe, which, in my view, is not prepared for a direct military confrontation with Russia. This is illustrated by statements from the EU’s chief diplomat, Kaja Kallas, who has framed security guarantees for Ukraine around three elements: military assistance, training for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and support for Ukraine’s military-industrial complex.

This is important, but it does not constitute a security guarantee. Rather, it underscores Europe’s reluctance to take real risks.

I would also draw attention to the double standards of certain European countries. France, in particular, publicly declares its support for Ukraine while continuing to purchase Russian energy resources and refusing to transfer frozen Russian assets to Kyiv. In practice, this amounts to financing the active phase of the war.

Moreover, French President Emmanuel Macron recently stated that Europe must find a way to engage directly with the Russian dictator. In his words, “either a lasting peace is achieved” through the ongoing U.S.-led negotiations, “or we must find ways for Europeans to re-engage with Russia—transparently and in cooperation with Ukraine.”

In response, the Kremlin said that the Russian leader is ready to “conduct a dialogue” with President Macron. According to his press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, Russia has expressed readiness for such talks, adding that “if there is mutual political will, this can only be assessed positively.”

Taken together, these signals create a strong sense of double standards in the EU’s position on the continuation of the war in Ukraine. On the one hand, there are political declarations of support. On the other, expanded economic cooperation with the occupying power through ongoing energy purchases.

Against this backdrop, the United States has adopted a far tougher stance. Washington is attempting to push Europe—within NATO—to provide concrete military guarantees to Ukraine, but is encountering resistance from a number of European capitals.

It is precisely this reluctance among European partners to see Ukraine join NATO that has driven the search for an alternative security model. The United States recognises that Ukraine’s formal accession to the Alliance may be blocked, yet meaningful security guarantees can still be provided—directly.

I would draw a parallel with South Korea. North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, yet it does not dare to launch a full-scale aggression. The reason lies in the status of the Republic of Korea as a strategic partner of the United States—even without formal NATO membership.

The key element of this model is a demarcation zone with no heavy weapons on either side. The security of this zone is ensured not by the permanent presence of American troops, but by the U.S. nuclear deterrent. This is precisely the model now being proposed for Ukraine: not peacekeepers on the front line, but legally binding guarantees that make renewed aggression prohibitively risky for the Kremlin.

It is also worth noting the indirect signals Russia is already receiving. These include intensified strikes against the shadow fleet, operations targeting submarine capabilities, and pressure on strategic aviation. While these actions formally appear as Ukrainian initiatives, they are in fact elements of broader military pressure exerted by the United States. The Kremlin understands perfectly well under whose strategic umbrella these operations are being carried out.

A separate component of the proposals under discussion concerns the creation of free economic zones—particularly in areas of strategic resources and around the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

The logic here is straightforward: the absence of a military presence combined with strong economic interests on both sides. The involvement of American business in such projects becomes an additional security guarantee—neither party has an incentive to attack territory where it generates profit.

Media reports already indicate a U.S. proposal to establish a demarcation zone around the Zaporizhzhia NPP. According to a decree issued by the Russian leader, the entire Zaporizhzhia region has been declared part of the Russian Federation. Senior Kremlin officials have repeatedly claimed that the deployment of foreign military contingents on Ukrainian territory is unacceptable. At the same time, they argue that any foreign force responsible for security at the Zaporizhzhia NPP—even a private military company—would be stationed on territory Russia claims to have annexed.

Most importantly, this approach effectively puts an end to further territorial encroachments by the occupiers across the Zaporizhzhia region. By redefining security through deterrence, legal guarantees, and economic interdependence, the United States is drawing a clear red line that the Kremlin can neither ignore nor test without facing unacceptable consequences.

From Washington’s perspective, the situation is fairly clear. The United States has little interest in the long-term survival of the Russian Federation in its current form. This is precisely why it is offering Ukraine security guarantees for a ten-year period. In doing so, Washington is signalling that Ukraine retains historical prospects for the return of its temporarily occupied territories. Over such a timeframe, much can change within Russia itself—driven by internal and even biological factors, including the eventual death of the Russian dictator.

Against this backdrop, the current U.S. proposals are not declarative gestures or “empty words,” but an attempt to impose a new security architecture in which Ukraine receives genuine deterrence guarantees, even without formal accession to NATO.

Notably, the strongest resistance to this model comes not from Moscow, but from Europe—unwilling to leave its comfort zone and eager to shift the primary risks of war onto Ukraine.

In this sense, creating a precedent of confrontation between the European Union and the United States plays directly into the hands of the occupying power. The EU is seeking to increase its political subjectivity in the negotiation process, arguing that the war is taking place on the European continent and therefore requires a stronger European role.

At the same time, European leaders are guided first and foremost by their own interests. From this perspective, the continuation of the war in Ukraine allows the European Union to avoid a scenario of direct confrontation with Moscow—at Ukraine’s expense.

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