Behind the Illusion of Invincibility: The Fragile Architecture of Office Power
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The self-confidence of the current government led by Volodymyr Zelenskyy rests on several key pillars. The first is its ability to project the message “I am one of you” to a sufficiently broad segment of the electorate—positioning itself as both representative of society and immune to internal political challenge.
This is a powerful advantage—but only so long as it continues to function. After all, many things are readily forgiven to “one’s own people”: even major mistakes or crimes are ignored, and society often searches for explanations as to why everything is supposedly “normal.”
This significantly simplifies the task of managing public opinion, compared to a situation in which the authorities are forced to explain their actions and answer uncomfortable questions.
It also becomes easier to silence opponents—by taking television channels off the air, blocking their distribution on Telegram and other social media platforms.
The task is even simpler when the media environment can be manipulated through fear of law enforcement agencies or of mobilization.
The second pillar is de facto control over law enforcement.
A collective “state bureau of repression,” in the style associated with Portnov, operates through various institutions—prosecutors’ offices, investigative bodies, and courts—to methodically suppress those identified by the authorities.
The effectiveness of this instrument, however, is limited. It is constrained both by negative selection within these institutions—where loyalty is rewarded over professionalism—and by the mechanisms of resistance that remain: public opinion, the position of foreign partners, and the residual capacity of the opposition.
The third pillar is economic exploitation.
Here, too, there is the siphoning off of state monopolies, similar to the schemes uncovered by NABU in Operation Midas.
Raiding and the seizure of businesses with the assistance of “security forces” is a kind of reenactment of the “regional” era (again, bearing Portnov’s signature).
The arbitrariness of law enforcement officers, their pressure on businesses, and systematic extortion have become routine. The media have reported on these practices, various association protests, and polls reflect public dissatisfaction while demanding a change in partners
Fourth – patronage.
A network of appointments from “their own”—from the “neighborhood,” from business, from various parties and circles.
This is why the quality of management is so poor and why failures make you want to tear your hair out.
This is also why the bench is so short, and why so few capable people are willing to think and act.
In the “jar of pickles” that is the current establishment, the “pickle” has already reached a level of corruption that will spoil anyone.
It will take a long and systematic effort to correct the situation.
Ultimately, the “fifth element.” Irrational, yet effective. The “spirit of the times” that shapes priorities, perceptions, and circumstances.
A force composed of the elements described above (especially the first), but one that also preserves and allows power to reassert itself repeatedly—even turning deadly external threats to its advantage.
By the end of 2019, the economy had already begun to decline, and the expected miracle of prosperity had not materialized—but then the pandemic struck. Not before.
After the authorities’ incompetent handling of COVID, support for the government and for Zelenskyy personally fell to record lows—but then a full-scale invasion occurred. Certainly, not before.
By 2025, when illusions began to fade, foreign policy came to rely on the factor of “unity around support for one’s own people.” Whether a catastrophe in the Oval Office or tough negotiations under pressure, this approach remained.
This system is highly convenient for the political elite because it is oriented toward satisfying its own whims and desires.
The country’s problems are addressed only residually, and at a far-from-optimal standard, under the conditions of negative selection described earlier.
They operate as best they can, with whatever resources are available—something they once demonstrated openly in a famous performance.
That is why we must endure—not thanks to them, despite them relying on our own strength, initiative, and remaining capacities, with the understanding that we have no right to fail as a state, as Ukraine.
But we can and should do better.
The described power structure appeared unshakeable, “unbreakable”—like a house of cards that seems strong, each card propping up the next.
Yet, this “indestructibility” is illusory. At the heart of each element lies not professionalism, tradition, or trust, but the decay of impermanence, opportunism, and expediency.
That is why the structure began to crumble when the details of Operation Midas were leaked to the public. The key principle—impunity, the belief that “nothing will happen if you act on your own”—was called into question.
It is critically important for the country and the state to replace this gelatinous, shaky structure with one that is truly stable and enduring.
Where faith in a leader’s charisma is replaced by trust in tangible deeds and results.
Where fear gives way to transparency and predictability.
There, where corruption schemes are supplanted by mutual accountability.
These are all hallmarks of a government of national salvation, built on a coalition of unity.
This model offers a crucial advantage: increased management efficiency, driven by the pursuit of the best solutions under the pressures of mutual oversight and the competition of ideas.
But the authorities will not adopt this model voluntarily. They have always chosen comfort. To implement meaningful change, they must first lose it.
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